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O debate sobre Reestruturações da Dívida Soberana (RDS) está no centro da agenda de 
políticas econômicas globais. Em 2014, o FMI apresentou uma nova proposta contratual 
–como parte integrante de um conjunto de reformas– para organizar esses processos e 
permaneceu fora das discussões destinadas a elaborar um mecanismo estatutário 
dentro da ONU, o que acentuou as divisões existentes neste campo. Ao contrário da 
maior parte da literatura especializada que analisa os limites e potencialidades desta 
proposta do FMI em termos abstratos, este artigo faz isso através de um «jogo de 
posições nas disputas». Esta nova maneira de abordar o debate sobre RDS, que começa 
explicitando os pressupostos e os interesses desde onde os agentes falam neste campo, 
possibilita explicar por que existem não só opiniões diferentes, mas diretamente 
opostas, sobre o mesmo fato social (a nova iniciativa do FMI). Argumenta-se que esta 
proposta supera os modelos contratuais existentes, mas deixa aberto uma margem de 
incerteza sobre a correta organização das reestruturações futuras: a profundidade e as 
implicações de tal incerteza no mercado da dívida soberana assumem significados 
particularmente diferentes de acordo com a cosmovisão de cada uma das posições 
abordadas. 
Palavras-chave: Reestruturação da dívida soberana (RDS); Fundo monetário 
internacional (FMI); Cláusulas de ação coletiva (CACs); Cláusulas Pari Passu.  
 
Abstract  
The Sovereign Debt Restructuring (SDR) debate is at the center of the global economic 
political agenda. In 2014, the IMF issued a new contractual proposal –as an integral part 
of a set of reforms– to organize these processes but remained outside of the discussions 
that promoted the creation of an SDR statutory mechanism at the UN, something which 
marked the existing divisions in the SDR field. Unlike specialized scholars that analyze 
the limits and potentialities of the IMF contractual proposal in abstracto, this article 
does it by means of a «game of positions in dispute». This new way of approaching the 
SDR debate, which starts by making explicit the assumption and interests from where 
the agents in this field speak, helps to explain why there are not only diverse but directly 
opposite opinions about the same social fact (the IMF new proposal). It is argued that 
this proposal improves the existing models of contractual clauses, but it leaves a margin 
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depth and implications of this uncertainty in the sovereign debt market acquire 
particularly different meanings according to the worldview of each of the addressed 
positions. 
Keywords: Sovereign debt restructuring (SDR); International monetary fund (IMF); 
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I - Introduction 
 
Discussions about the correct ordering of Sovereign Debt Restructurings (SDRs) are once 
again at the center of the global economic political agenda (Bohoslavsky 2016). The 
cases of Greece and Argentina had wide international impact. In 2013, the IMF issued a 
report which pointed out failures in the manner of currently conducting these processes 
(IMF 2013a). Then, together with working groups of the USA Treasury and the 
International Capital Market Association (ICMA), the Fund began updating its framework 
for dealing with restructurings. The main advancement of this process was shown in a 
2014 report which basically introduced new models of collective action (CACs) and pari 
passu clauses (IMF 2014b). 
The proposal generated an intense debate, which became more complex with 
the entrance of new players in the discussion that promoted the creation of an SDR 
statutory mechanism at the UN (UNCTAD 2015; A/RES/68/304 2014; Gelpern 2016). In 
this scenario, it is possible to find not only different but also opposite opinions about the 
new contractual clauses: some commentators qualify the IMF initiative as pro-debtor 
(PIIE 2014, 31, Hung Tran) and others as pro-creditor (Alvarez and Adelarde 2015; PIIE 
2014, 33–34, A. Gelpner); many analysts argue that this proposal intervenes in a 
nonexistent problem (Mooney 2015, 68), while others hold it does so in only one of the 
multiple SDR existing problems (J. E. Stiglitz et al. 2014); some observers present the 
initiative as the result of a particularly democratic process (Hagan 2014, 1) and others 
see it as part of an essentially exclusionary one (Brooks et al. 2015, 8; Stichelmans 2015, 
9–10); finally, some commentators believe that the changes proposed by the IMF are 
superficial (Alvarez and Adelarde 2015, 17), while others consider that it has taken a “big 
step forward” (Gelpner 2014, 3). How can such different positions coexist concerning 
the same social fact? Or more specifically: where do these observers speak from? 
This article analyzes the potentialities and limits of the new IMF proposal –(IMF 
2014b)– by means of a «game of positions in dispute» (Bourdieu 2008; Bourdieu 2000). 
In this sense, scholars specialized in international political economy have stated that the 
definition of how, when and to what amount should sovereign debts be restructured is 
an essentially «political or ideological» issue (Brooks and Lombardi 2015, 7; PIIE 2014, 
34, Anne Gelpner). In this paper, the image of the academic field as a neutral and ascetic 
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replaced by the image of a space in/of dispute, in which different social agents compete 
to impose their own worldview as the legitimate worldview. This field, relatively 
autonomous of the rest of the social universe, is organized around positions which are 
structurally and historically defined one in relation to the others (Bourdieu 2008). Each 
position lies on diverse interests and has a relatively distinctive way of thinking about 
the financial market (its agents, institutions and relations with other social spaces) 
without which its visibility –it is believed– is impossible to understand the SDR debate in 
a comprehensive way. 
The literature shows this debate in dichotomous terms. Indeed, the debate 
appears organized around two antagonistic positions which are defined according to the 
«type of regulative modality» that they promote in order to organize SDRs; this is to say, 
a debate between “contractualists vs. statutorists” (Hofmann 2014). Thus, the new IMF 
proposal is seen as a triumph of the first over the second position (Makoff and Kahn 
2015, 3), as represented in a concrete way by the referred UN Committee, whose work 
ended in 2015 without having drafted the planned statutory mechanism, but listing a set 
of SDR guiding principles (A/RES/69/319 2015).  
 
Table 1 
Redefining SDRs debate: dimensions and positions in dispute 
 
                         Regulative 
                                 modality  
IMF  




















Table made by the author.  
 
                                                          
1 In fact, a SDR “non-contractual” mechanism could be set by means of a set of different regulative 
modalities (ex. “statute”, “convention”, “treaty”, etc). For practical reasons, this article uses the word 
“statutory” (the most used in the literature) to refer to all of these modalities, even knowing that technically 
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This dichotomous image of the debate is judged incomplete. Bolton noted, in 
this sense, that among the opponents to the statutory approach coexist two positions 
with different but not easily reconcilable perspectives (Bolton 2003, 49 and 60). While 
some agents support the contractual approach because of its efficiency at the time of 
ordering SDRs, others do so because of its inefficiency: in effect, whilst –Bolton 
observes– the contractualists of the former position argue that this approach already 
delivers most of the benefits of a statutory approach, the contractualists of the latter 
position believe that, under its influence, SDRs will be highly costly, something which 
they deem as positive and desirable since it imposes discipline on Debtor States (Bolton 
2003, 60). The former position became hegemonic at the IMF in the early twenty-first 
century, so we call it «contractual-internalist» position. The latter position is still active 
and maintains a critical perspective with respect to the Fund SDR framework 
(«contractual-externalist» position). 
Among the statutorists there are also conflictive opinions about this framework. 
While some pro-statutory approach agents argue that an SDR process supported by an 
IMF financial program is the best option for a country and the world at the time of 
avoiding a crisis (A. O. Krueger 2002; A. Krueger 2013), for other statutorists such kind of 
programs not only do not prevent crisis but, on the contrary, cause them (J. Stiglitz 
2009). The former, around which we built the «statutory-internalist» position, acquired 
greater visibility in the Anne Krueger proposal about setting a statutory mechanism, 
named as SDRM, at the IMF (A. O. Krueger 2002), whilst the latter were dominant in the 
aforementioned UN Committee. These latter ones –which we locate in the «statutory-
externalist» position–, hold a heterodox conception of the economy (Guzman and 
Stiglitz 2015). 
Thus, the article introduces a new map of the SDR debate. Its originality derives 
not only from adding new positions to this debate but, mainly, from its own logic of 
construction. This paper starts with an objectifying process of the academic field 
directed to analyze the discourse of academicians in the space of the sovereign debt 
market in order to discover the criteria by means they themselves «identify with» or 
«differ from» in this space of the field. The analysis of these criteria helps, on the one 
hand, to justify the dimensions chosen to create the four positions shown in Table 1; on 
the other, it helps to define these positions with the depth required to address the 
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The objective of this article gives centrality to the IMF framework to deal with 
SDRs. The works which criticize the contractual approach «from outside» the Fund do 
not explain in depth the main aspects of the proposal they criticize, which has been its 
evolution nor how it is connected to the rest of the policies and practices that the IMF 
promotes to organize SDR processes.2 The works that promote or criticize this approach 
«from inside» the institution preserve these limits but at the cost of sidelining the 
contractual nature of its approach or, in more general terms, the assumptions which the 
framework is based on.3 This paper attempts to offer an improved picture of the debate 
by incorporating the strengths of both research groups. In effect, the article defines, 
firstly, the IMF SDR framework by using IMF official documents and updates it by 
showing its recent reforms. Secondly, the paper inserts the new models of clauses 
proposed by the 2014 IMF report in this framework and, summarily, traces their origin 
and evolution. Only then, thirdly, does the article introduce the criticisms associated to 
this report –its limits and potentialities– not from only one perspective but from the 
range of perspectives arising from the referred positions. 
It is argued that these limits and potentialities cannot be thought of in absolute 
or abstract terms. Explaining from where the commentators speak in the SDR debate 
supposes understanding that their opinions on the 2014 IMF report only make sense: a) 
in the context of their relations with the other positions that structure this academic 
field; b) considering the assumptions their positions rest on and the interests that guide 
them. This article shows that the four positions agree in observing that the new models 
of clauses proposed by the IMF: a) are better than the existing arrangements concerning 
the ability to manage SDR collective action problems; b) do not have the power to 
promptly and fully remove the degree of uncertainty that currently exists in the SDR 
context. Excluding this basic coincidence, it is observed, the four positions offer different 





                                                          
2 For instance, see Brooks et al. (2015).  
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II - Classificatory and defining criteria of the positions in dispute at the SDR debate: 
justification and conceptualization of the chosen criteria 
 
The academic discourse, materialized in different academic works, is a power discourse. 
Culture producers have the ability to spread their own viewpoint of the world to other 
sectors of society since their knowledge is perceived by those sectors as legitimate. In 
the contemporary world, scientific knowledge is exhibited as «the knowledge of all 
knowledge» as it possesses attributes of objectivity and universality held more accurate 
than the attributes recognized to other intellectual creations (Bourdieu 2000). In the 
particular case of the new contractual models, the impact of the academicians who 
promote such models on the sovereign debt market is magnified because their academic 
contributions are supported and translated to the international economic policy field by 
the central players of the global financial governance. 
The academic discourse is a discourse of power. While in the preceding 
paragraph the emphasis was laid on the effects of this discourse on the actual world, it is 
here focused on the conditions which produce it (Torres 2011). The academic field is 
understood as a field of dispute, where different agents mutually compete in a context 
of structurally unequal social relations. Unlike the visions that show the homo 
academicus as a disinterested observer, and his work as the result of purely individual 
inspiration, this article presupposes that objective and independent consciousness 
conditions mark his very existence. Considering the homo academicus as an interested 
subject does not, by contrast, imply to reduce his conduct to extra-academic social 
determinants as suggested by some in mechanistic sociology, but to recognize that 
these determinants are mediated by a field with rules which are relatively autonomous 
of other social spaces. Intellectual success is never reduced to market success. The 
degree of autonomy of the academic field of the political and economic fields is always a 
historical issue (Bourdieu 2002). In the specific case of the new IMF proposal, the 
academic autonomy is reduced since its content is consulted with official and private 
agents, knowing that its effectiveness depends on the approval procedure of part of the 
Fund governing body. 
This minor degree of autonomy has effects over the construction of the object 
of analysis. In this sense, it should be noted that this article analyzes a portion of the 
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the economic fields are diffuse. Even so, it has been decided to locate the object of 
analysis within the academic field because of the totality of the discourses circulating in 
society around the new IMF/ICMA proposal we are interested in analyze those 
discourses existing in the literature that legitimize or criticize the proposal based on a 
specialized knowledge: those discourses emanating from «specialists» in the area of 
study of sovereign debt restructurings.  
The contrast contractualists vs. statutarists is commonplace in the literature. 
Nevertheless, there is not a unique criterion at the time of defining these positions. 
Some authors construct these ideal types highlighting the “nature of the subject that 
puts into effect their rules” (contractual-private/voluntary vs. statutory-
official/institutional), (Mooney 2015); others stress the “degree of generality” of such 
rules (contractual-ad hoc vs. statutory-general/uniform), (Haley 2014; Bolton and Skeel 
2007); some scholars refer to the “kind of economy” that, they understand, these ideal 
types promote (contractual-market/laissez fair vs. statutory/regulative), (Hagan 2014; 
Ranieri 2015); others think about the “kind of negotiation” that, they believe, these 
idealized modalities encourage (contractual-decentralized/autonomous vs. statutory-
structured) (Bolton and Skeel 2007); finally, many commentators stress “the content”, 
introducing a series of features generally present in statutory proposals but absent in 
contractual initiatives (Brooks et al. 2015).  
This article takes the «degree of autonomy of the contracting parties» as a 
defining criterion of this conceptual pair. It is a conceptually precise criterion and also 
flexible enough to include in it the wide range of SDR existing proposals. A statutory 
mechanism is by definition a «supra-contractual» regulative modality that operates 
independently of the will of the contracting parties. We here meet a formal criterion of 
definition which does not invalidate the abovementioned criteria but redefine them 
according to their own characterization. In effect, a statutory mechanism is “supra-
contractual” since it has been approved by an authority with political power above 
private agents; it is “general” as far as its rules are valid in the areas where such 
authority exercises its power; finally, it is “regulative” since its rules are mandatory 
whether they may have or not been incorporated in contracts. By default, a contractual 
arrangement is “voluntary, decentralized and a market solution” (Gelpner 2014). 
The contrast “internalist vs. externalist” is not usual in the specialized literature. 
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types taking into account the position of key «authors». This possibility was ruled out 
since authors rarely follow a totally linear academic path and their opinions can hardly 
be pigeonholed into one particular position. Bourdieu proposes overcoming this 
difficulty by differentiating between empirical and epistemic individuals, also called 
«social agents». These latter are historical abstractions that a researcher defines 
according to a set of ideal properties which produce effects in a particular field: a 
scientific concept idealizes a limited number of features of the empirical individuals and 
makes them equivalent on a level of reality intended to be investigated (Bourdieu 2008, 
37). The article is built considering «social agents» and not particular authors, whose 
positions can be identified with the introduced positions but not be fully reduced to 
them.  
Another possibility was to classify the SDR academic universe considering 
criteria of differentiation, characteristic of the «USA political field». These criteria are 
used in those works which analyze the historical disputes related to the drafting of the 
USA bankruptcy law (Bolton 2003). The idealized position of the authors of the 
“republican right” is identified with the search of regulations meant to assure strong 
property rights, and the position of the “democratic left” is rather identified with the 
inclination to safeguard the interests of certain vulnerable social sectors. This criterion, 
Bolton rightly explains, cannot be directly extrapolated to the international arena 
(Bolton 2003, 49). In fact, both Bush (republican) and Obama (democratic) 
administrations supported models of CACs promoted by the IMF (contractual-internalist 
position). However, the reader should note that certain aspects of the positions in Table 
1 can be identified with typical features of the idealized republican and democratic 
types concerning the weight that the USA has in the global financial governance. 
The division «universalists vs. territorialists» is present in the cross boarder 
corporate bankruptcies debate (Bernstein 2013). The former propose that these 
bankruptcies be resolved under the bankruptcy law of a single host jurisdiction, while 
the latter advocate for the intervention of several jurisdictions. A hypothetical observer 
could associate the universalist with the statutory position and the territorialist with the 
contractualist one. However, this is not accurate. There is not an international or 
domestic bankruptcy law for sovereign debt. Litigations involving Debtor States are 
substantiated in accordance with the civil or commercial law of a particular jurisdiction. 
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level (Makoff 2015)–, the involved parties should agree to submit their conflicts to such 
law by a statute or contract. 
There are «pro-creditor and pro-debtor» positions in the SDR debate (Ugarchete 
2007a, 47).  There are commentators who believe that a priori creditors are the weaker 
party in sovereign debt negotiations, that the IMF is not a creditor-friendly institution 
and that the statutory approaches would limit creditors´ rights (PIIE 2014, 29–31; 
Mooney 2015, 68–69); there are other commentators who believe exactly the opposite 
(Ugarchete and Acosta 2003). This classificatory criterion is ruled out since these 
extremes cannot be proved in abstracto. There is nothing in the essence of a contractual 
or statutory regulatory modality that turns it a priori into a pro-debtor or pro-creditor 
modality. Thus, an observer can assert that the new IMF proposal is beneficial to one or 
another group, depending on the pre-assumptions and the standpoint taken to support 
the assertion. 
Still another possibility was to classify the academic field specialized in sovereign 
debt market following the idealized positions: «emerging vs. advanced countries» 
(Montes and Wierzba 2015). At the center of this criterion stands the position of these 
extremes in relation to the transformation –emerging countries– or conservation –
advanced countries– of the current International Financial Architecture (IFA). Recently, 
this criterion has acquired visibility because the G7 countries and the IMF refused to 
participate in the UN discussions, promoted by emerging countries (G77 + China), aimed 
to create a statutory mechanism (Gelpern 2016). While this is appropriate for the 
analysis of particular cases, it is understood that it cannot be properly extended to all 
SDR cases: in this sense, for example, it is relevant to note that key academic groups of 
the G7 countries strongly encouraged the UN process and, on the contrary, the new IMF 
proposal received the support of emerging countries on its Executive Board. 
Finally, the division between «orthodox vs. heterodox» economic positions can 
be found in the specialized literature (Kulfas and Schorr 2003; Lee 2012). At the heart of 
this differentiation is the opposite consideration about the “self-regulatory logic of the 
market”. While the orthodox ideal type pre-assumes that the financial market tends 
naturally towards equilibrium and efficiency, the heterodox type argues that this market 
rarely tends to these extremes in a concrete historical reality (J. Stiglitz 2009). Although 
key elements of this criterion can be perceived in the externalist positions of Table 1, 
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positions nor between them and the here so-called statutory-internalist position (ex. 
SDRM-Krueger ). This criterion was also dismissed on the grounds that the definition of 
what «economic mainstream» means is more vague and ambiguous –and therefore 
more likely to be disputed– than the definition of the category «IMF framework for 
dealing with SDR» introduced below. 
 
 
III - The IMF framework for SDRs: new models of CACs and pari passu clauses 
  
Since the start of the financial globalization era in the 1970s, the IMF has been playing 
the leading role in the prevention, management and resolution of financial crises in 
emerging countries (Ugarchete 2007a; Lee 2012). The Fund participated in the previous 
restructuring stages via its surveillance functions. The IMF Debt Sustainability Analysis 
(DSA) is often a key element at the moment of deciding the activation of this kind of 
processes. Once it is activated, Gelpner explains, the Fund is, de facto, the principal 
designer and arbiter of the restructuring plan, and also determines the role of all other 
players (PIIE 2014, 23, Gelpner A.). Finally, the IMF is the agent which, in the post-
restructuring phase, controls the effectiveness of the process as long as the program 
signed with the national authorities (3 or 4 years) holds. 
Nevertheless, the IMF does not have a unified framework specifically designed 
for dealing with SDR processes (PIIE 2014, 23, Lombardi D.). This framework arises, in a 
residual manner (PIIE 2014, 25, Gelpner A. ), from the legal frameworks of other areas of 
interest to the Fund (the reason why we use the word “framework” and not “legal 
framework” for restructurings). Its content stems from a combination of prescriptions 
established, at least, in the following “regulative tools”: the IMF «articles of agreement», 
its «conventions» with other forums or financial institutions, and its «reports» and 
«guidelines» which, on the one hand, organize its lending policy, the DSA and its 
conditionalities and, on the other, introduce contractual clause models to be 
incorporated in future debt issue contracts. None of these modalities operate 
separately; only their articulation in a given historical moment may draw up the content 
of the referred framework.  
The IMF legal frameworks are not fixed. In recent years, the Fund has undergone 
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of the IMF framework for SDRs was built after the financial crises that affected emerging 
countries in the late 1990s and early 2000s on the basis of the architecture constructed 
in the post-Bretton Woods period. This structure is currently under review. The Fund is 
presently going through an updating process –not of substitution– of the policies and 
institutes established in response to the aforementioned crises. 
The 2013 IMF report is central in this process (IMF 2013a). This report sets four 
priority reform areas in order to improve the current performance of SDR processes; 
such areas concern: a) collective action problems (ex. CACs); b) lending policy of 
exceptional access to the IMF resources; c) lending policy in arrears (LIA policy) to 
official creditors; d) the good faith criterion of the LIA policy. The first three reform areas 
have already been completed; the fourth is still in progress (IMF 2016a). Bellow, the IMF 
framework for SDRs is introduced, based on the 2013 report (IMF 2013a). 
 
III.1– Key elements of the IMF framework for SDRs. 
 
The IMF Articles of Agreement establish that the Fund must provide financing to 
help its member-states to solve their balance of payment problems (IMF 2009). When a 
country faces economic distress, the financing from the Fund –the 2013 Report points 
out– tends to catalyze spontaneous external financing from the private sector and, in 
some cases, new financing from the official sector to contribute to the solution of the 
aforementioned problems. In said cases, a member-state is able to continue to service 
its debt in accordance with the original terms, without having to restructure it (IMF 
2013a, point 5). 
However, there are circumstances when this logic is not, a priori, viable. A 
country´s difficulty to have easy market access plus an excessive debt level appear as 
warning signals for the IMF at the time of committing its resources: the decision is 
complex, because in these cases the need for financing the balance of payment deficit is 
often particularly high. Originally, the IMF Articles of Agreement banned financing large 
deficits. However, Boughton observes, in the 1960s the Fund started, de facto, to do it. 
The transformations which took place in the international financial system after the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods agreement gradually turned the IMF into a «lender of last 
resort». By the mid 1990s, exceptional access to the Fund resources (that is, exceeding 
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The crises, which in this context the emerging markets experienced, opened a wide-
ranging debate (Boughton, Brooks, and Lombardi 2014). 
The main lesson of this debate for the IMF was that its legal framework for 
“exceptional access lending” was too permissive. In this sense, before 2002, this access 
was granted on the basis of an “exceptional circumstances” clause that did not include 
any substantive criteria (IMF 2015b, point 5). The position which finally prevailed in the 
Fund was to understand that not all crises were likely to be prevented by means of 
bailouts; in some circumstances, bailouts were not only not beneficial but the costs for 
almost all the sovereign debt market players affected by economic distress increased. 
Following these considerations, in the early twenty-first century, the IMF reformed four 
keys areas with direct implications on its framework for SDRs.   
Firstly, in 2002-2003 the IMF adopted a framework that required countries in 
crisis to meet four criteria in order to receive very large loans from the Fund. In brief, it 
was required that the involved country have a large balance of payments need, that a 
rigorous assessment of the country’s debt find the debt burden sustainable with a high 
degree of probability, that the country have good prospects for regaining market access 
while IMF resources are outstanding, and that the country’s policies in support of the 
loan were likely to be implemented and to achieve the specified macroeconomic targets 
(Schadler 2015, 2). This change, which ultimately limited exceptional access to the Fund 
resources, modified the dynamic of SDR events to the extent that in the cases in which 
exceptional access to the IMF loan is denied, it is recommended that the country in 
distress start a restructuring process of its sovereign debt as quickly as possible. While 
the decision to activate this kind of process is the responsibility of the concerned State 
government, the Fund recommendation is in practice a sign difficult to ignore as it 
influences the expectations of all market players (IMF 2013a, point 8). 
These criteria were tested during the subsequent years. The 2013 Report 
analyzed the practical experience of the new IMF legal framework and suggested a 
review, particularly because of the uncertainty generated by the Greek case, when a 
fifth ad hoc criterion to enable exceptional access to the Fund resources was added in 
2010. The review actually took place in 2014-2015 (IMF 2014c; IMF 2015b) and the 
results were approved by the IMF Executive Board in January 2016 (IMF 2016b). The 
approved reforms included, firstly, the elimination of the «systemic exemption» 
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assessed to be sustainable but not with «high probability» (IMF 2016b). With this last 
reform, the IMF intends to provide incentives to accelerate the times of activation of the 
restructuring processes for those intermediate cases (or “gray zone” cases) in which a 
sovereign debt, although not unsustainable, is not deemed fully sustainable. In such 
cases, the Fund does not recommend a debt reduction in terms of capital and/or 
interest but to reschedule its maturities, and it provides exceptional financial support for 
this purpose (IMF 2015b). 
Secondly, between 2002 and 2005, the IMF advanced precisely with its 
framework for measuring the sustainability of a sovereign debt (Schadler 2016). The 
DSA, by which this measurement is done, should not be thought of in terms of a purely 
technical tool but as a true methodological and conceptual framework with decisive 
implications for the activities of the IMF. The DSA, Schandler states, is a framework for 
analyzing the risks inherent to a country’s fiscal policy and level of sovereign 
indebtedness (Schadler 2016, 3–4). This analysis, which takes different forms depending 
on whether the country is advanced, emerging or low income (IMF 2011; IMF 2013b), is 
carried out via a complex operation that takes into account different features of a 
country’s fiscal policy and debt position, both observed currently and projected to 
several risk scenarios. The data used in this operation come mainly from the information 
that the Fund collects by means of its annual surveillance missions (Art. IV, Articles of 
Agreement), (Schadler 2016). 
The link between the DSA and SDR processes is manifested in different 
dimensions. First, when the debt of a country is defined by the IMF as «unsustainable», 
the financial agents tend to avoid financing the affected economy and, still worse, tend 
to withdraw their capital until the core problems are resolved. Therefore, this IMF 
statement impacts on the government's decision to activate a process in order to reduce 
or reschedule its debt. On the contrary, in absence of such statement, creditors, in a 
pre-default scenario, can judge a restructuring initiated by a State as unnecessary and, 
then, refrain from providing support to the process. Secondly, the DSA influences the 
determination of the amount and type of debt to be restructured and, consequently, its 
restructuring plan. Thirdly, if this plan is carried out with the support of an IMF financing 
program, the DSA helps to define its conditionalities (Schadler 2016). 
These conditionalities, considered in the IMF Articles of Agreement, are justified 
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need of restructuring its debt and redirect it to ensure debt sustainability in the medium 
and long term. The IMF resources are granted by stages, with the aim of monitoring the 
actual compliance of the conditionalities on the part of the national authorities 
following a schedule that can be extended for 3 or 4 years depending on the kind of 
approved programs. In practice, the Fund often coordinates financial rescue packages 
with other multilateral or official lenders and, in some cases, also with private actors 
whose funds are delivered following the aforementioned schedule. The amounts of 
these packages are strategically fixed at below the financial requirements of the 
member-state to guarantee that it adjust its fiscal policy for serving its debt. In 2002 and 
again in 2009, after the global crisis, the Fund's guidelines on conditionality were 
significantly modified.4 Since then, conditionalities have been established following a 
«macro-critical» approach that limits them to those considered strictly necessary in 
accordance with the core functions of the IMF; they acquire different forms depending 
on new kinds of facilities and their progress is not monitored by the «structural 
performance criteria» used until 2009 (IMF 2012).  These programs send signals to the 
players involved in a restructuring process. A negative or successful review of an IMF 
program can influence the degree of support given by creditors to this process or affect 
debt sustainability in a post-restructuring scenario (A. O. Krueger and Hagan 2005).   
Thirdly, in 1999, the IMF revised its 1989 «non-toleration policy» to expand its 
capacity to provide financing in post-default contexts (IMF 1999). The Fund always 
recommends that the member avoid default: “avoiding a default –the 2013 Report 
states– is important not only because it may exacerbate the immediate economic and 
financial dislocation, but also because it may undermine the member’s capacity to re–
access international private capital in the medium term, which, (…) is a key requirement 
for Fund lending” (IMF 2013a, point 15). In pre-default contexts the State initiates a 
“preemptive” debt restructuring, in terms of the IMF, and continues to serve its debt 
during the process. Because speed is of the essence in preemptive cases, the IMF does 
not require a particular form of dialogue between creditors and the debtor and 
acknowledges that a non-negotiated offer, albeit following informal consultations with 
creditors, may be the most efficient way to proceed (IMF 2013a). The recent flexibility of 
the IMF exceptional access framework specifically seeks to promote preemptive debt 
                                                          
4  See, IMF Factsheet, “IMF Conditionality”, March 24, 2016, 
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restructurings considering that it is preferable to assume the risk of committing 
resources even in cases where debt sustainability is not judged with «high probability», 
in the hope that a timely debt reschedule may prevent default and the possible spread 
of the economic distress situation of the restructuring State to other related markets 
(IMF 2015b). 
However, there are circumstances when default is inevitable. Originally, the IMF 
did not grant financing to its member-states until they did not cancel arrears with its 
creditors (“non-toleration policy”). In 1989, for commercial banks, and later, in 1999, for 
all external private creditors,5 the Fund relaxed this policy to avoid situations where such 
creditors may exercise a veto over Fund lending decisions. The LIA policy seeks to 
support effective adjustments while facilitating orderly debt restructuring to restore 
external viability. The LIA policy applies only when judgment has been made so that (i) 
prompt Fund support is considered essential for the successful implementation of the 
member’s adjustment program, and (ii) the member pursues appropriate policies and 
makes a “good faith effort” to reach a collaborative agreement with its private creditors 
(IMF 1999). Unlike preemptive debt restructurings, in the post-default cases the Fund 
sets expectations on the form of the dialogue between the debtor and its creditors, 
which need to be consistent with the good-faith effort (IMF 2013a, point 16). The 2013 
report considered necessary to review these expectations (review that is currently 
underway), (IMF 2016a).   
As a general principle, the IMF does not grant financial support to member-
states who are in arrears with official or multilateral creditors (Fund's policy on non–
toleration of arrears to official creditors, 1989), (IMF 1999). This asymmetry with respect 
to private creditors is justified in the IMF view, which argues that official and multilateral 
creditors make investments for public interests and assist distressed Debtor States when 
private agents leave their markets (IMF 2015a, point 8). The Fund has developed a 
number of conventions on how this policy of non toleration is applied in practice. These 
conventions ultimately relax it and seek not to obstruct a possible IMF support to a 
restructuring plan. Indeed, a) arrears with the IMF itself or with the World Bank are 
considered resolved if the program provides for their clearance (IMF–WB concordat 
1989); b) arrears with official creditors of the Paris Club are considered resolved for IMF 
                                                          
5 The LIA policy applies to (i) sovereign arrears to external private creditors and (ii) non sovereign arrears to 
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purposes when financing assurances are received from the Paris Club prior to the 
approval of a request for use of Fund resources; c) in cases where there is no formal 
Paris Club Agreed Minute, tacit approval of an official bilateral creditor has been 
deemed sufficient to satisfy the Fund’s arrears policy.6 At the request of the 2013 
Report, in December 2015 the IMF Executive Board decided to modify its policy on non-
toleration (IMF 2015c). In line with the mentioned flexibility, the reform of 2015 allows 
the IMF, in certain circumstances, to lend to a member-state in arrears with official 
creditors and, in consequence, collaborate in an orderly debt restructuring process.7  
Fourthly, in 2002-2003 and concomitantly with other forums (G10, IIF, European 
Community), the IMF promoted models of contractual clauses for dealing with holdouts 
or dissenting creditor problems (M. Weidemaier and Gulati 2013). These models are 
under review. In this sense, the 2013 Report stated: “while creditor participation has 
been adequate in recent restructurings, the current contractual, market-based approach 
to debt restructuring is becoming less potent in overcoming collective action problems” 
(IMF 2013a, 2). The report of October 1, 2014 (hereinafter, 2014 Report), as shown 
below, is the main IMF's response to this observation (IMF 2014b). 
 
III.2– Summary of the new IMF proposal for dealing with holdout problems  
 
When a State cannot honor its debts, refinancing or reducing it is promoted. 
However, in the current circumstances, debt restructuring cannot be imposed on 
creditors. In other words, no change in the original terms of a debt contract can become 
effective until the new terms have not been voluntarily accepted by creditors. In the 
case of SDR processes that usually involve not one but hundreds or thousands of 
creditors, dissident creditor (or holdout) conflicts arise, which involves, at least, the 
                                                          
6 “Such tacit approval is generally conveyed through non–objection in the Executive Board when the 
member’s request for Fund financial support is discussed, notwithstanding the arrears” (IMF 2013a, point 
17). 
7 The new policy lists the necessary conditions that will allow the IMF to consider lending to those countries 
in default on official debt: 1) prompt financial support from the Fund is determined to be essential and the 
country is pursuing appropriate policies; 2) the Paris Club has not provided financing assurances, or a Paris 
Club Agreed Minute does not exist; 3) the IMF assesses the debtor is making good faith efforts and the 
official creditor is a holdout; 4) the IMF assesses that the decision to lend into arrears would not have an 
undue negative effect on the Fund’s ability to mobilize official financing in the future. IMF “Daily News”: 
“IMF presents its policy on lending into arrears to official creditors”, December 11, 2015, 
http://concorde.ua/en/research/daily/imf-presents-its-policy-on-lending-arrears-to-official-14853/, (visited 
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following questions: Should the restructuring offer be accepted by 100% of creditors or 
is there some way of organizing their consent in a collective form? Can just one creditor 
block or obstruct an SDR agreement reached with thousands of other creditors? Which 
is the way in cases when a majority of creditors discriminate against a minority with 
specific characteristics? Can a group of creditors collect 100% of their credits and 
another group is made a significant reduction on theirs?    
These questions, here theoretically introduced, have obtained different 
responses in recent restructurings, in some cases with a high cost for many of the 
players involved. The 2014 Report intends to find a satisfactory solution to this problem; 
basically, by promoting new contents and/or interpretations of the pari passu clauses 
and CACs in future sovereign debt issuances (IMF 2014b). 
The pari passu clause, used at least since the early twentieth century, acquired a 
special significance over recent years. Judgments against Debtor States are difficult to 
enforce in court because of their sovereign character. The pari passu clause became, in 
the late 1990s, a sui generis alternative to enforce them (M. C. Weidemaier and Gelpern 
2013). The 2014 Report explains that there are, in general terms, two ways of 
interpreting its meaning and scope. Its traditional and common interpretation refers 
exclusively to the “ranking” of creditors. Following a series of concrete actions, 
governments can bring down the ranking and, consequently, the value of a given bond 
in relation to other bond/bonds issued by the same State. In this interpretation, the pari 
passu clause is precisely a clause designed to protect a group of creditors from a 
possible discrimination of their claims in favor of other groups among them (IMF 2014b, 
10).  
The dissenting interpretation is broader. Some, the IMF Report observes, “have 
argued, however, that the pari passu clause reaches further and means a payment 
obligation which requires the sovereign debtor to pay its creditors on a pro rata or 
‘ratable’ basis. Specifically, if a debt is due and payable to a given creditor, the clause 
will prevent the debtor from making payments to that creditor unless it makes ratable 
payments to other creditors whose debts are also due and payable” (IMF 2014b, 10). 
This latter interpretation is the one that courts have followed at the time of turning the 
pari passu clause into a sui generis alternative to enforce their judgments. Indeed, once 
judges have observed that the clause has been transgressed in a particular case, judges 
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paying its debt– to abstain from paying those creditors who have accepted the 
restructuring offer until the Debtor State comply with the sentence that orders to pay 
the plaintiff creditors (M. C. Weidemaier and Gelpern 2013). 
This type of interpretation and use of the pari passu clause, the IMF states, 
exacerbate the collective action problem and, therefore, increase uncertainty on 
international financial markets (Guzman and Stiglitz 2015). Hence, the 2014 Report 
concludes that “based on the uncertainty created around the interpretation of the pari 
passu, its staff holds that pari passu clauses should be drafted in a manner that, in 
accordance with the ICMA Model Clauses, explicitly excludes the obligation to make 
ratable payments” (IMF 2014b, 15); that is to say, inversely, they must be drafted in a 
manner which does not lead to an interpretation other than that related to “creditor 
ranking”. 
CACs are directed to organize the consent of creditors concerning a 
restructuring offer in a collective form. Although CACs, the IMF report states, exhibit a 
number of different features, the most important one is that which enables a qualified 
majority of bondholders to bind a dissenting minority to the terms of a State offer, 
making restructuring more difficult to block. More specifically, CACs allow modifying the 
financial terms of a certain debt if the State restructuring proposal is supported by a 
predetermined percentage of creditors (usually, 75%) (IMF 2014b, 16). 
CACs have acquired different modalities over recent decades. Typically, they 
operated «series by series». In sovereign debt contracts, it was stipulated that if a 
percentage of bondholders (usually 75%) of a particular series accepted the debt 
restructuring offer, the other bondholders of that series should remain tied to the terms 
of this offer. “Although existing CACs –the 2014 Report points out– have helped mitigate 
the collective action problem in SDR, they have not solved the holdout problem (…) they 
allow the possibility that a creditor, or a group of creditors, can obtain a "blocking 
position" in a particular series and effectively nullify the operation of CACs in that series” 
(IMF 2014b, 18). 
Hence, some countries (Argentina, Dominican Republic, Greece and Uruguay) 
drafted CACs with «two-limbs». These models offer a voting structure which requires a 
qualified majority for each particular series on the one hand, and, on the other, for all 
series being restructured. The key advantage of these CACs with respect to the previous 
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66.6%, making it more expensive and difficult for holdouts to reach a blocking position. 
This reduction is compensated by the second required limb: no individual series can be 
restructured in the absence of a minimum level of support (usually, of 75% or 85%) for 
all bond series (IMF 2014b, 19). 
Although the two-limb aggregation of CACs supposes a welcome improvement, 
they still allow holdouts to obtain a blocking position: they need over 33.3% of the 
bonds of a particular series to reach it. “In such cases, –the IMF Report states– the 
particular holdout series would be excluded from the restructuring, while the 
restructuring would still hold for other series until the two-limb voting threshold is met. 
In this scenario, bondholders would not be protected and the restructuring would go 
forward without including all bond series; then, their incentive to participate would be 
reduced” (IMF 2014b, 19). 
Following said considerations, the IMF, in line with the ICMA Model Clauses, 
proposed a new voting procedure: the so called «single-limb» procedure. This is the 
main innovation in the Fund Report. This new procedure requires only one limb to be 
achieved in future SDRs (in principle, 75%) calculated on an aggregate basis of all 
affected bond series; in other words, this approach excludes or renders unnecessary the 
traditional series-by-series vote. 
There was, the IMF proposal says, broad consensus among those agents who 
participated in its design, since this new CAC model would provide a very effective tool 
to address collective action problems: “By eliminating the requirement of a series-by-
series vote (…), a single-limb voting procedure effectively removes the possibility [of 
holdouts] of obtaining a position of control over a particular issuance to block the 
restructuring of said issuance” (IMF 2014b, 20).  
However, there are cases when flexibility is needed in order to offer different 
creditors different restructuring terms. In such cases, following the ICMA Model Clauses, 
the Fund provides two solutions: one of them, when new CACs enable a government to 
use the «single-limb» voting procedure to conduct separate voting procedures for 
different groups of bond issuances. “This ‘sub-aggregation’ feature has the benefit –the 
2014 Report notes– of both allowing differentiation among different groups of 
bondholders while, at the same time, reducing the leverage of a holdout creditor who 
could undermine a restructuring by obtaining a significant position in a particular bond 
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single-limb CACs do not imply the disappearance of existing voting procedures. In this 
sense, the IMF report offers to use «series-by-series» or «two-limb» CACs models when 
governments consider it appropriate in order to distinguish different kinds of creditors. 
It suggests, in the latter case, that two-limb CACs utilize the following percentage rates: 
a) 66.6% for the aggregate voting; b) 50% for each series, to hinder dissident creditors’ 
blocking activities (IMF 2014b, 23).   
Thus, it may be seen that the core of the IMF proposal in relation to CACs 
consists in a new «single-limb» voting procedure. However, in order to avoid the rigidity 
that could eventually arise, this proposal supports the inclusion, in future sovereign debt 
contracts, of a menu of voting procedures which includes: a) a single-limb voting 
procedure with the possibility of «sub-aggregation»; b) a two-limb aggregation voting 
procedure; c) a traditional series-by-series voting procedure (IMF 2014b, 30). 
 
 
IV– Different views about the new IMF proposal: a game of positions in dispute.  
 
Below, the opinions of commentators of the SDR debate about the briefly described IMF 
proposal are introduced, not from a unique perspective but in terms of a «game of 
positions». The presentation of the four positions shown in Table 1 is organized 
considering the following elements: 1) their location in the academic field of sovereign 
debt market in relation to the chosen dimensions (contractual-statutory and internalist-
externalist); 2) their relation to other positions in the field; 3) the pre-assumptions and 
interests related to their opinion about the Fund framework, in general, and the 2014 
Report, in particular. 
 
IV.1– Contractual-internalist position  
 
The agents in this position promote the contractual approach from within the 
IMF framework for SDRs. This starting point does not imply that they uncritically adhere 
to these extremes.8 Their position can only be thought of in terms of a reaction against 
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those who promote a statutory approach, first in the early 2000s, in the form of the 
SDRM, and then in 2014, by way of the UN Assembly.9 
The IMF, even with its limitations, these agents understand, is and –should be– 
the leading institution in global governance: it offers a wide range of different goods and 
services contributing to common global goods and is, at this stage of the historical 
development of the financial architecture, irreplaceable by another institution (PIIE 
2014, 45–49, Ted Truman). The Fund is, unlike the UN, a specific technically appropriate 
forum, with the required resources to conduct this kind of discussions.10  
From this perspective, the 2014 Report emerged from a reflexive and 
particularly participatory building process: “it comes out –Gelpner (who participated in 
the process) observes– of an intense collaboration between public officials and private 
sector representatives who managed to agree on a problem, a solution” (Gelpner 2014, 
2). Its construction involved a debate of 18 months among different sovereign debt 
market players.11 On the contrary, the representatives of this view interpret the UN 
process as untimely and with limited discussion times.12  
The initiative represents an incremental change to the status quo, something 
positive for the agents of this perspective (Gelpner 2014; G30 2002). This is so because 
«gradualism» generates certainty in the financial system and facilitates the construction 
of agreements among its participants. Comparatively –they believe–, a statutory change 
would be a radical and risky step which could have unforeseeable consequences: if 
private lenders perceive that the wording of a statutory mechanism could harm their 
interests, they will increase borrowing costs and limit the flow of currency towards 
emerging markets with negative consequences for the entire global economy (G30 
2002). 
Unlike a statutory proposal, the IMF initiative –the representatives of this 
position claim– is politically feasible (Gelpern 2013; Hagan 2014). The incorporation of 
                                                          
9 This position does not make a difference between the statutory mechanism proposed in 2001/3 by 
Krueger and those mechanisms proposed in 2014 at the UN; in other words, both instances are presented as 
part of the same historical process. See, for instance Hagan (2014).  
10 See the arguments of those countries who voted negatively at the UN General Assembly, (A/RES/68/304 
2014).  
11 “On the design –the Director of the IMF Legal Department explains– for the last 18 months we have been 
discussing the design of these clauses with market participants, issuers, and the official sector” (Hagan 2014, 
1).  
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the proposed models of clauses in future debt contracts is voluntary. The initiative is 
based on a broad consensus and, in particular, has the support of creditors. The latter 
represent the collective subject to consult and convince: “We understood –the Director 
of the IMF Legal Department says– that, since this approach is market-based, not 
surprisingly, it requires consultation with the market (…). The degree to which these 
provisions have been embraced by the market reflect the fact that creditors understand 
that it’s in their interest (…). These CACs don’t shift legal leverage from the creditors to 
the debtor. Rather, they can be understood as shifting legal leverage from individual 
creditors to creditors as a group. So it gives creditors, as a group, greater control over 
the process” (Hagan 2014, 1–2).  
In this view, the benefits of the new proposed models are shown and valued in 
relation to the existing clause models. Its promoters consider that the new initiative, as 
it standardizes the wording of the pari passu clauses in models supported by the IMF 
and the ICMA (IMF 2014b), contributes to provide greater predictability for future 
financial practices. In particular, the 2014 Report aims to minimize the concerns created 
by the Court of New York decisions in “NML Capital vs. Argentina” case: “creditors may 
not be willing to participate in a future restructuring –the Report warns– unless they are 
assured that the stream of payments owed to them under the restructured debt will not 
be susceptible to interruption by [legal] actions taken by holdout creditors, actions quite 
similar to those taken by the holdout creditors in the case of Argentina” (IMF 2014b, 35).  
The proposal seeks to minimize this risk, firstly, by introducing models that specifically 
adhere to the restrictive interpretation of the pari passu clause (ranking of creditors) 
and, secondly, by recommending that the United States amend its Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act (FSIA), making clear that injunctions cannot be used to attack a 
restructuring offer made by a Debtor State (IMF 2014b, 35). 
The “single-limb” CACs are judged, following this perspective, better than the 
“series-by-series” and “two-limb” CACs at the time of addressing collective action 
problems (IMF 2014b). By aggregating all the bond series in the same voting procedure, 
dissenting creditors must amass a substantially greater amount of bonds than in the 
past to block it: in economic terms, Makoff and Kahn state, the holdout strategy takes a 
particularly high operational and financial risk when dissident creditors need to become 
“the largest creditor” of a State to block its restructuring (Makoff and Kahn 2015, 4). 
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sub-aggregation”, “series-by-series” or “two-limb”), the success chances of a holdout 
strategy are minimized in the new proposed scheme. This is so to the extent that such 
election is exercised before the restructuring offer is communicated to the public, 
making difficult for a dissident investor to predict in advance which of the voting 
procedures will actually be used and, consequently, buy the appropriate bond type and 
amount to carry out a holdout strategy (Makoff and Kahn 2015, 4–5).   
The holders of this position perceive a number of challenges/risks to ensure that 
the proposed initiative works properly. First of all emerge the issue of the «diffusion of 
the new models» and «the stock of existing bonds». The contractual approach, unlike 
the statutory, does not produce immediate effects. The designed models will be 
effective only if they are incorporated by the interested parties in their future debt 
issuances and, in that sense –as the Director of the IMF Legal Department recognizes– 
the function of the institution “is necessarily limited” (Hagan 2014, 1), but –we add– it is 
relevant considering its experience with former clauses. The wide attention that the 
Argentinean case had is highlighted as a factor that can help to the rapid spread of the 
new models (Gelpner 2014). 
However, and assuming that these models had actually been welcomed by the 
market players, the question arises: how about the bonds already issued? The initiative, 
given its contractual nature, does not apply to them. According to the 2014 Report, the 
outstanding stock of existing bonds is of approximately 900 billion dollars (IMF 2014b, 
33): the period (which the IMF itself estimates in about 10 years) (IMF 2014b) that is still 
left until the expiration of this significant stock of bonds represents –in the words of the 
IMF authorities– “a risk” to the proper organization of SDRs (IMF 2014a, 2).    
This risk acquires, in this position, distinctive characteristics depending on 
whether the clauses are pari passu or CACs. With the pari passu, the success of SDR 
processes that include bonds of the existing stock –the IMF states– “will depend, largely, 
on how the courts interpret pari passu clauses in future litigations. In particular, if the 
New York Court decisions are interpreted broadly, there is a significant risk that the 
restructuring process may be hurt by these clauses. If, however, the New York Court 
decisions are interpreted more strictly, the risks will be mitigated” (IMF 2014b, 34). The 
Argentinean case is perceived as a relevant precedent in this context, although the size 
of this precedent cannot be –in this view– predicted with certainty taking into account 
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who promote the new CAC models recognize that injustice instances can occur during 
this transition period: in effect, Makoff and Kahn explain, bondholders in the same 
conditions can receive significantly different treatment in the same restructuring 
process by the mere fact that their bonds have CACs worded differently (Makoff and 
Kahn 2015, 6). To limit this risk, the IMF recommends replacing the old bonds for new 
bonds which include the proposed CACs models (Makoff and Kahn 2015; IMF 2014b). 
Secondly, the 2014 Report analyzes the risk that the new voting procedure may 
cause inequality between groups of creditors. To address this concern, the IMF proposal 
prescribed that, “in circumstances where the sovereign issuer wishes to utilize a single-
limb voting procedure, it could do so only if all affected bondholders are offered the 
same [restructuring] instrument or an identical menu of instruments” (IMF 2014b, 21).  
With the same objective, the Fund warns that the Debtor State should act with 
transparency and provide, prior to making a restructuring offer, creditors with adequate 
information about the qualities of the process, the way it will be carried out and, in 
particular, about the content of CACs (IMF 2014b, 25). In addition, the IMF initiative 
promotes the inclusion of “covenant information” in debt contracts. By this covenant, 
the Debtor State commits itself to providing creditors with data about its economic and 
financial situation and its government programs (IMF 2014b, 25 and 31).  
Thirdly and closely linked to the former point, the so-called ‘minority problem’13 
emerges: some experts and analysts have suggested that the single-limb voting 
procedure, because it cuts across all bond series, may affect democratic values and fair 
treatment under certain circumstances, when the decision of a creditor majority 
discriminates against a dissident minority (FMLC 2015, 5). In such instances, the IMF 
proposal compels the Debtor State to act in good faith (IMF 2014b, 26). In cases of ill 
faith, the affected minorities could request the judges, of the jurisdictions prescribed in 
its bonds, to intervene in order to safeguard their rights and interests (FMLC 2015, 8). 
Finally, this position considers the “risk of abuse of power”: during the 
discussions, the Fund report points out, creditors stated their concern about the 
possibility that a sovereign debtor manipulates the voting process by exercising 
influence on the control entities (IMF 2014b, 26). Thus, the institution proposes, 
                                                          
13 “One of the biggest potential risks of aggregation is that it may provide an opportunity for the debtor and 
a qualified majority of creditors to discriminate against a minority of creditors who, although they do not 
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according to the ICMA clause models, robust “disenfranchisement” provisions to 
exclude from voting all the bonds owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the 
sovereign issuer or by its public sector instrumentalities (IMF 2014b, 26).  
 
IV.2– Contractual–externalist position 
 
Those holding this perspective promote the contractual approach from an 
external position to the IMF framework for SDRs. They pre-assume «market efficiency»: 
the market is understood as a self-regulated social order mechanism that, following its 
own logic, tends to balance. Concerning restructuring processes, the basic premise these 
agents set off from is the one which considers that the market “is able to solve by itself 
the sovereign debt problems” (Krueger, quoted by Alvarez and Adelarde 2015, 18). 
More importantly, the market «should be» the one who solves them. 
At the center of the sovereign debt market, an inter-dependent relationship 
between “lenders-creditors” and “states-debtors” is introduced. The contractual-
externalists are not, in the SDR debate, an equidistant voice between these extremes: 
their position represents the voice of the private agents or, simply, the voice of «the 
market».14 This statement does not imply ignoring the existence of other participant 
agents in the financial system (IMF, official sector, academicians, lawyers, etc.): the fact 
is that –in this view– when these agents intervene in the system, playing a role different 
from that suppliers or demanders of money, they do it from a secondary and exogenous 
place to such essential relationship of the sovereign debt market (Mooney 2015; PIIE 
2014, 29, Hung Tran ). Nor does this statement imply that this position seeks the welfare 
of creditors in a selfish way. For its promoters, there is an alignment between the 
interests of this collective group, those of the official sector (in particular, of the 
USA/the-G7 official sector) and the interests of the global financial system, so that if the 
interests of creditors are promoted by means of the free market logic, a virtuous circle 
resulting in overall benefits occurs (Shapiro and Pham 2009). In the field of the SDR 
debate, this position is located comparatively far from the statutory positions, so that its 
agents, in particular circumstances, can support a contractual IMF initiative, not because 
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of a deep coincidence with its pre-assumptions, but to avoid greater evil (that is, the 
possible wording of a statutory mechanism). 
Contracts are, from this perspective, the regulative modality of the market par 
excellence (Bolton 2003, 59). Suppliers and demanders, in decentralized manner, 
negotiate their rights and obligations without the intervention of a third party. 
Consequently, contracts do not interfere with the self-regulatory dynamic of the market. 
In the sovereign debt market, the exchange good is ultimately «money»; contracts 
regulate money property rights. Once a contract has been drafted, the parties are 
governed by its rules. These rules, of course, are expected to be respected. The agents 
of this position carry this general principle to an extreme: in the view of many market 
participants –the G-10 Working Group observes– (…) the obligation to repay [a 
sovereign debt] should be considered almost as "sacred" by the debtor” (G10 1996, 11).  
However, there are circumstances when the debtor's payment capacity is in 
doubt. In these circumstances, the market, represented by the contracting parties, is 
who should approve the modifications in the contract original terms (PIIE 2014, 29–32, 
Hung Tran). Nevertheless, for this perspective, there is a gap between the market ability 
to order restructuring processes hypothetically and in practice: indeed, these agents 
argue that in practice the ideal market efficiency to organize SDR processes has been, 
over recent years, undermined by means of interventions and situations which have 
weakened «market discipline» and «creditors´ rights» (Scott 2006).  It is here, precisely, 
where the core of the criticisms of this position towards the IMF is found: the Fund, it is 
estimated, has contributed to such undermining (Scott 2006, 17). 
The IMF –the agents of this position state– does not «understand», «value» or 
«fully trust» the market. The Fund does not «understand» it, since the Fund relates to 
the market externally: that is to say, the IMF does not know in depth the logic that 
governs markets because the IMF does not live its practices daily (PIIE 2014, 8, Minovi 
Maziar). In particular, the Fund has not internalized the profound changes of the 
financial globalization and largely continues to behave as in the 1980s when the 
sovereign debt market was organized around an identifiable set of large commercial 
banks (PIIE 2014, 13, Lerrick Adam).  Considering it is the private agents who set in 
motion the vast majority of the resources in the sovereign debt market, the IMF does 
not «value» the market –in this perspective– when it does not grant it the weight that it 
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managing director of Goldman Sachs Investment Management says– are involved in the 
capital of flows that both create crises and hopefully prevent them (…), hopefully we can 
add some value [to the SDR debate]” (PIIE 2014, 9, Minovi Maziar). The IMF does not 
«fully trust» the market, since –these agents observe– its authorities are always 
measuring up what and how much information should be given to the market 
participants for fear that such information can make them fly a distress country. This 
proceeding –it is here understood– is a logical consequence of the distorted image of 
the market that the IMF has: the market is viewed –a former executive of Salomon 
Brothers metaphorically says– by the official sector as a “big, stupid and easily 
frightened” animal that, therefore, is potentially harmful “to everyone around it”.15   
Following these assumptions, the IMF involvement in crises is judged –in this 
position– as inadequate. In the first place, this perspective calls into question the 
concept of “crisis prevention” itself. Crises, even considering their cost, play a positive 
role in the economic system in the medium or long term. Their prevention, it is argued, 
can alter the market signals, maintaining inefficient political and financial practices over 
time.16 Secondly, these agents consider that the Fund interventions should be directed 
exclusively to facilitate «market discipline». The IMF should not try, as it intends, to 
control it. The Fund should collaborate and work with the market using tools to 
encourage or punish the participants´ behavior, providing as much information as 
possible so that these participants can strategically act and accept the cost of their 
mistakes when their conducts are wrong. The opposite route –Adam Lerrick concludes– 
is not going to prevent crises; it is only going, as it actually happens, to make them more 
severe and more frequent (PIIE 2014, 13, Lerrick Adam).     
In this scenario, contractual-externalists object some of the pillars of the IMF 
framework for SDRs. The permissive lending policy of the Fund –Scott argues– 
undermined market discipline in the 1990s: the IMF should, therefore, put more 
                                                          
15  Adam Lerrick said: “I remembered when I was five years old my father sent me into the barn to start 
taking care of the horses by myself. He said “always remember horses are very big, very strong, not very 
intelligent, and easily frightened. And that makes them a danger to themselves and to others.” That’s the 
way the official sector views markets. They’re big, strong, stupid, and easily frightened. Therefore, they are 
danger to everyone around them”, (PIIE 2014, 13).  
16 “In preparation for today, Maziar said, I thought I’d look around my colleagues in the market and ask 
them what thoughts and ideas they had about improving IMF surveillance and crisis prevention. About 70 
percent of the reaction was just a blank stare back. “What do you mean? That’s not a concept anybody 
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emphasis on an anti-bailout approach and not promote its lending catalytic effect (Scott 
2006, 17 and 27). In particular, this position: a) welcomes the IMF legal framework for 
“exceptional access lending” created in 2002. The point is that the criteria of this 
framework are not met in practice, when the debtor is a State of intermediate 
development (ex. Greece or Argentina). Consequently, the Fund should create greater 
institutional barriers for exceptionally accessing its resources rather than facilitating it 
(Scott 2006, 43), as its latest reform does (IMF 2015b);17 b) understands negatively the 
ability of the IMF to lend debtors in arrears (a nice term, Scott ironically observes, for 
referring to “default”), (Scott 2006, 19).  The LIA framework of 1989/1999 is deemed 
inadequate since it differentiates between private and official sectors.18 Credits from 
governments and multilateral agencies –it is considered– should not be privileged. The 
recent modification of this framework –(IMF 2015a)–  which restricts the difference 
between those two sectors is assessed as positive but partial;19c) welcomes the 
reduction of the IMF conditionalities of the early 2000s (Scott 2006).  In this perspective, 
it is the market (and not the official sector) who should reward or punish appropriate or 
inappropriate government policies (Meltzer 2000). Nevertheless, private agents 
emphasize that the useful aspects of IMF practices (in terms of surveillance, for 
instance) are enhanced when the IMF holds an active program with a State in distress 
(PIIE 2014, 9, Minovi Maziar) and they judge as positive, although clearly insufficient, the 
Fund tools which help to discipline debtors distancing from good financial practices 
(Shapiro and Pham 2009). 
With specific regards to the 2014 Report, the opinions of the agents of this 
position can be taken to be two: in relation to pari passu clauses and in relation to CACs. 
Their viewpoint in the case of the former clauses is better understood if the following 
question is made: what can be done to make a Debtor State best meet its commitments 
or, inversely, what tools have creditors to enforce their rights? These agents consider 
that the answer to this question does not favor creditors: States suffer very little the 
consequences of default or, in other words, there are no effective enforcement 
                                                          
17 This opinion is deduced by the author of this article following an analogy process through which he 
extends the general rationale of the contractual-externalists to the concrete case of the quoted new reform. 
18 Susan Schadler explains how the removal of the de facto IMF lending privileged position would contribute 
to market discipline (PIIE 2014, 28).  
19This opinion is deduced by the author of this article, following an analogy process through which he 
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mechanisms (Scott 2006). From this perspective, this situation –which in the short run 
clearly harms this collective subject–, is not good for the global system in general 
because it is not properly seen in «market signals» (Buchheit, Gelpern, and Gulati 2013).  
The IMF has contributed to this situation. In a market economy –it is argued–, the price 
and amount of financing are related to the sovereign risk and this risk, in turn, to the 
cost in case of non-compliance. When market intervention makes the cost of default rise 
or drop, the lending costs should go up or down, correspondingly.  If this is not so, the 
market operates out of balance, generating situations of sovereign under- or over-
borrowing.20  Over–borrowing is one of the key causes of malfunctioning of the financial 
system and, in particular, of default: “the only, Scott affirms, effective remedy against 
sovereign over-borrowing is to allow creditors to enforce their contract rights effectively 
against sovereigns in default. Any well functioning debt market depends on strong 
creditor rights” (Scott 2006, 1).   
The 2014 Report, as understood in this view, is one more measure of the IMF in 
a direction opposite to the aforementioned sense (PIIE 2014, 31, Hung Tran). In default 
cases, creditors –in the form and place their contracts establish– can go to court in order 
to protect their rights. However, in practice, they have found serious difficulties at the 
time of enforcing judgments against sovereign States. The 2014 Report, it is judged, 
weakens creditors’ rights: a) by promoting an interpretation of the pari passu clause 
which prevents its utilization as an alternative mechanism for enforcing judgments (PIIE 
2014, 29, Hung Tran). The contracting parties, being consenting adults –says the 
Executive Managing Director of the IIF in this sense–, are the ones who should decide 
whether to include in their contracts the broad or narrow interpretation of the clause 
(PIIE 2014, 29, Hung Tran): the way in which the IMF faced this debate –he observes– is 
very problematic “because it leads to misguided efforts to really weaken creditor rights 
unnecessarily” (PIIE 2014, 29, Hung Tran). In this scenario, the actions of vulture funds 
and the decisions of the Courts of New York in the Argentinean case, with regards to 
these efforts, are perceived by these agents as positive or, at least, as not negative;21 b) 
by recommending the amendment of the FSIA for increasing the legal protection of 
                                                          
20 These concepts are defined in terms of the economic marginalist tradition: “underborrowing—that is, 
they may be borrowing beyond the point at which the social cost of one additional unit of debt equals the 
social benefit of an additional unit of debt–financed government expenditure” (Buchheit, Gelpern, and 
Gulati 2013, 8).  
21 For instance, Alfaro, Noel and Ahmed analyze the actions of the vulture funds in terms of a “regime” to 
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sovereign States. These agents understand that such amendment should be applied, 
precisely, in the opposite sense; that is to say, giving creditors the ability to collect their 
claims by means of seizing assets of the debtor government and its enterprises, and, in 
particular, of its central bank reserves. These agents also encourage disciplinary 
measures on those States that refuse to comply with court decisions or have not acted 
in accordance with good financial practices (Scott 2006, 1). 
This position about the new CACs follows the preceding logic: the new CACs are 
considered a step further in undermining the rights of creditors (PIIE 2014, 31, Hung 
Tran). Different from the 2014 Report discourse, this stance considers the IMF concerns 
about collective action problems exaggerated (Bolton 2003, 61). Some commentators go 
even further by arguing that SDR processes have in general worked well over the last 
decades (PIIE 2014, 29–31, Hung Tran), which does not mean that, from this 
perspective, the SDR organization has been perfect: “No, –the IIF Executive Managing 
Director states– it’s not perfect nor should it be, because breaking contracts is a bad 
thing, not a good thing, and it should not be made easy or perfect” (PIIE 2014, 29–31, 
Hung Tran). Similarly, this perspective calls into question whether the IMF proposed 
models are fully voluntary: “CACs were not, despite the advertising, a market solution. 
The market [previously] had been free to choose (…). [Currently], what happened is that 
the U.S. Treasury and the G7 imposed these new CACs on the marketplace to facilitate 
sovereign restructuring” (Scott 2006, 35).  
The agents of this position justify this assertion by comparing the new CACs 
models not with their preceding models –as the 2014 Report does– but with other types 
of clauses: CACs facilitate sovereign restructuring from the moment CACs allow 
modification of the terms of contracts with an adherence rate of 66% or 75%; before 
2003, the widespread practice in New York Law bonds was 100% adherence 
(“unanimous consent”), (Ranieri 2015). Previously, a creditor could individually request 
the acceleration of a sovereign debt; at present, CACs impose 25% adherence (Scott 
2006, 43). From this perspective, these percentages should be abolished or, at least, 
modified not to weaken the negotiating position of creditors:  90% adherence rather 
than 75% increases the creditors´ chances of receiving better offers on the part of a 
Debtor State (Scott 2006). However, it should not be thought that this position has a 
negative opinion about the «total» 2014 Report: this Report, in fact, incorporates a 
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etc.) which debtors should meet during restructuring processes; prescriptions which 




IV–3 Statutory-internalist position     
 
This position promotes a statutory approach from within the IMF. Like 
contractualists-internalists, it is thought that a rapid and ordered process of 
restructuring is essential at the time of preventing or resolving financial crises; on the 
other hand, the IMF plays a central role in this task, and should continue to do so (A. 
Krueger 2013). However, the agents of this perspective argue that the Fund current 
framework for SDRs does not fully solve the problems that arise in these processes 
(Haley 2014). The basic premise they start off from is the understanding that this 
framework makes restructurings unnecessarily expensive for all the good faith parties 
involved (A. O. Krueger and Hagan 2005, 204): the absence of a statutory mechanism 
has a negative impact on the smooth functioning of the global financial market and, in 
particular, prevents the IMF from adequately carrying out its mission (A. O. Krueger and 
Hagan 2005). 
This stance emerged from debates in the early 2000s. The structural 
transformations that this market suffered in the previous decades reduced, in the 1990s, 
the effectiveness of the IMF «case-by-case» strategy of the 1980s (A. O. Krueger 2002). 
In this scenario –Krueger and Hagan state–, a broad consensus emerged: in 
circumstances of sovereign debt un-sustainability, debtors, creditors and the system in 
general benefit from restructuring (A. O. Krueger and Hagan 2005, 203). But, this 
consensus was not extended to the way of organizing these processes. In this sense, the 
spread of CACs in 2003 is not seen –from this perspective– as part of a fully consented 
process but as a result of a strategic action on the part of the private sector and of a 
fraction of the official sector to stop the preparation of the statutory mechanism 
proposed by Krueger (A. O. Krueger and Hagan 2005, 203–4). This strategic action –it is 
understood– reduced and turned the complex SDR debate that was taking place into 
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Thus, the IMF framework designed in the early 2000s to organize SDR processes 
is judged as «residual», «fragmented» and «incomplete». It is «residual» since the 
institution does not have a legal framework specifically created to deal with these 
events (PIIE 2014, 25, Gelpner Anne). This absence, Boughton points out, generates 
“inconsistency [in the IMF practices], which can exacerbate economic uncertainty and 
unduly politicize crisis management” (Boughton, Brooks, and Lombardi 2014, 7–8). It is 
«fragmented» to the extent that it arises from a set of reports and guidelines written by 
different IMF departments in relation to relatively autonomous policies. It is a 
framework of difficult accessibility for those who are not particularly specialized in the 
dynamics of the Fund, and its rules are less consistent than those of a hypothetical 
SDRM, written at one go and contained in only one text (Ranieri 2015, 291). It is 
«incomplete» because it does not address restructuring processes in a holistic manner. 
Local bankruptcy laws give direct response to a series of complex questions that the 
current IMF approach faces only incidentally (Bolton 2003). There are, therefore, gray 
areas that conspire against the definition of a clear role of the Fund in cases of crisis and 
make it permeable to pressures of different interested agents (Boughton, Brooks, and 
Lombardi 2014, 7). 
In particular, this view criticizes the basic argument that contractualists-
internalists use to legitimize their adherence to the contractual approach: this approach, 
contractualists-internalists state, can achieve results of a comparatively similar efficiency 
to those of a statutory mechanism without the need of having to face such political 
challenge (Bolton 2003, 60). CACs, statutarists state, work properly only in relatively 
small and homogeneous cases (Bolton and Skeel 2007, 286). When a restructuring 
process involves a sovereign State with thousands of creditors of different size and 
structure, with bonds issued in different series and currencies, and governed by several 
laws and jurisdictions, –as usual on the contemporary sovereign debt market–, CACs, 
given their own ad hoc, voluntary and decentralized nature, lose efficiency (Bolton and 
Skeel 2007).  
The current IMF approach, as here understood, does not reduce the cost of 
restructuring as it should be expected to do (A. O. Krueger and Hagan 2005, 204). The 
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actually exercise influence, although not in a one dimensional form,22 on sovereign 
under- or over-borrowing (Bolton 2003, 61). However, in situations of economic distress, 
expectations of high cost to refinance or reduce a sovereign debt is not reflected in 
efficient practices as contractualists argue: on the contrary, in such cases –statutarists 
claim– the actors involved tend to shy away from the idealized rationale of the homo 
economicus, something which, ultimately, increases the probability of a crisis outbreak 
and the cost of a possible restructuring process.23 Consequently, these agents argue that 
an appropriate framework for SDRs should be provided in order to remove its stigma 
and help its substantiation by means of a set of uniform and consistent rules to give 
these processes predictability in all the corresponding steps, something the IMF 
framework –precisely because of its residual, fragmented and incomplete character – 
cannot fully achieve (Buchheit, Gelpern, and Gulati 2013).    
In this context, statutarists stress the issues of SDR «startup times» and «depth» 
and claim that, in practice, restructuring processes tend to be too little too late; 
something which –they point out– largely reflects the lack of a specific and 
comprehensive statutory framework (Haley 2014; Bolton 2003). This framework, they 
argue, should have been designed when the IMF made access to its resources more 
restrictive: the result of the reform of the early 2000s was, on the one hand, a Fund 
lending policy that in future would recommend activation of an SDR process as requisite 
for accessing its exceptional resources and, on the other, the promotion of CACs which 
do not specifically regulate the beginning of these processes and help only with some of 
the SDR problems (Bolton and Skeel 2007, 38).  In other words, in the early 2000s, the 
IMF established for itself restrictive criteria of «exceptional access lending» and left in 
the hands of «the market» the capacity to regulate processes which are activated in 
moments when the Debtor State and its creditors are going through economic distress 
which usually makes them abandon the homo economicus rationale, required precisely 
for proper market functioning (Bolton 2003, 61–63). This way, the IMF unnecessarily 
raises restructurings costs by adding, to their intrinsic costs, the costs derived from a 
                                                          
22 This statement is relevant because contractualists state that if the restructuring cost goes down, 
restructuring processes would go from being too little and too late to being too much and too early. 
Statutarists deem this concern as exaggerated and abstract: Debtor States, they argue, will not 
opportunistically activate these processes because in practice the high cost associated with restructurings is 
just only one of the many existing deterrent dimensions, and it is the creditors who ultimately approve or 
not a restructuring offer. See, (Buchheit, Gelpern, and Gulati 2013). 
23 See Bolton's enumeration of the dimensions that move the agents that operate in the sovereign debt 
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framework which does not accelerate, as should be expected, the startup times and 
leaves unanswered a number of questions that prevent the involved parties from 
foreseeing that the process they are embarking on will be effective and ordered. Thus, 
SDR processes lose their capacity to prevent or resolve financial crises with the negative 
consequences which arise for the system in general and for the IMF in particular. In this 
context, the latest reform of the Fund lending policy –(IMF 2015b)– is deemed positive 
but partial.24 
The contractual approach, statutarists observe, does not ensure the 
participation of the international community in SDRs (A. O. Krueger 2002). Comparative 
analyses of corporate bankruptcy laws show that the intervention of an impartial third 
party in a negotiation process whose stages are legally structured is a constant in the 
different legislations, although the role of the third party and the characteristics of the 
stages vary depending on the particularities of each domestic system (A. O. Krueger 
2002; Bolton 2003). CACs, by their contractual nature, presuppose a decentralized and 
autonomous relation between a Debtor State and its creditors; a priori, there is not in 
CACs a structuring of the negotiation process or a third party intervention similar to that 
in the corporate field. When the universe of the debt to be restructured is relatively 
small and homogeneous, such circumstances –it is here understood– do not seem to be 
decisive. However, this statement varies when the universe is complex and includes 
agents of different size, rationale and interests, because of the degree of difficulty this 
situation generates at the time of coordinating collective actions and the conflicts often 
arising between debtor/creditors and creditors themselves (A. O. Krueger 2002; Bolton 
2003). The IMF involvement in restructurings, as planned in its own framework, is not 
enough to fill this legal vacuum because its role is not adequately defined and because 
the Fund is not impartial or has capacities specifically designed to control these 
processes (G30 2002, 7). 
Neither, from this perspective, does the IMF framework establish consistent and 
enforceable priority rules (Bolton and Skeel 2007). At corporate level, Bolton and Skeel 
claim, perhaps the most prominent feature of bankruptcy laws is that which enables a 
company to request bankruptcy in order to obtain a temporary relief from its creditors 
and to request the permission of the court to obtain new financing, usually from its own 
                                                          
24 This opinion is deduced by the author of this article, following an analogy process through which he 
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creditors, with a clear priority status in order to preserve the value of its assets (Bolton 
and Skeel 2007, 3). At sovereign level, these possibilities are not regulated. This legal gap 
is filled in practice by means of a de facto priority given to multilateral agency loans and, 
circumstantially, by differentiating between credits of the official and of the private 
sector (IMF LIA policy), (IMF 1999). This approach causes uncertainty and concern about 
«moral hazards», which could be reduced by means of a statutory mechanism with 
priority rules expressly written (Bolton and Skeel 2007, 3–4). 
With specific regards to the 2014 Report, firstly, these agents highlight the 
transitional problems observed by contractualists-internalists themselves. While the 
proposed models were not actually incorporated in debt contracts and still a stock of 
outstanding bonds with other types of clauses remains active, contractualists-
internalists note, a transitional period with a certain degree of uncertainty and possible 
inequities in the SDR field is expected (Makoff and Kahn 2015, 6),  which –statutarists 
add– could be avoided with the creation of a statutory mechanism (Ranieri 2015).  
However, this position goes a step further by also tying these transitional 
problems to the nature of the contractual approach itself. The probability that a 
sovereign restructuring works properly is related closely to the ability of a debtor, in the 
same process, to relate creditors holding bonds with organizational clauses written in 
«identical manner» (Ranieri 2015, 285). The new “single-limb” CACs extend this 
requirement not only to a particular bonds series but to all bond series that the debtor 
wishes to aggregate in a restructuring. The problem is that each credit operation is a 
priori an independent act of other credit operations. The parties negotiate the content 
of their clauses in each operation in a decentralized manner; they could or not adhere to 
the new models, or adhere but modifying them. Also, it is relevant to observe that these 
models were designed exclusively for bonds governed by New York and England Laws 
(IMF 2014b, 6). All these considerations make it difficult to assure that, as a matter of 
fact, the contractual clauses in future will effectively have identical wording; in fact, the 
2014 Report itself accepts that the wording of the clauses varies according to the 
practices of different jurisdictions (IMF 2014b, 6). Consequently, statutarists warn that 
the IMF contractual approach offers, in essence, a higher degree of uncertainty than the 
statutory approach which would involve the same set of rules for all the cases to be 
conducted under its domain. Again, they observe that this degree of uncertainty grows 
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Krueger asserts– uncertainty grows in cases in which the clauses are subject to the 
interpretation of different jurisdictions (A. O. Krueger 2002, 32). 
Secondly, in this view, the broad pari passu clause interpretation, which recently 
the New York Courts embraced, has a negative impact on the proper organization of 
SDRs (A. Krueger 2013). Thus, the agents holding this perspective deem the new model 
of clauses proposed by the 2014 Report as a step forward, although insufficient.25 Unlike 
contractualists-internalists, these agents are strongly against vulture funds without 
considering the particularities of the cases in which they operate, and associate the 
vulture funds existence to the lack of a statutory mechanism (A. Krueger 2013). 
Corporate bankruptcy laws, statutarists note, accumulate in the same process all the 
assets and debts of the debtor. One of the essential functions of these laws is to solve 
economic problems in a collective manner; problems which because of their intensity 
affect or have the potential to affect the rights stipulated not in one but in multiple 
individual contracts. Therefore, such laws suspend the legal actions or similar claims 
individually initiated by creditors during the restructuring process (Bolton 2003). The 
solution offered by the 2014 Report concerning the pari passu clause is understood as 
insufficient since it gives way to judicial actions during SDR processes, something that 
increases uncertainty in terms of «holdouts» and «deadweight loss» problems.26 These 
statutarists propose a legal mechanism that includes stays and creates a Forum with 
specific capacities to solve the particular problems of SDR processes (concerning, for 
example, credit verification) (A. O. Krueger 2002). 
The new CACs models are also seen –in this view– as positive (A. Krueger 2014). 
The possibility that a qualified creditor majority ties a minority to the terms of an 
agreement legitimately reached with a debtor is a common feature in corporate 
bankruptcy laws. The new IMF report aims to replicate via contracts one of the main 
features of a statutory mechanism: the aggregation of credits from different series in 
the same restructuring process. In this sense, and as the 2014 Report considers it, the 
“series-by-series” and “two-limb” CACs reduce but do not eliminate the holdout 
problem. The statutarists-internalists´ concerns about the “single-limb” CACs are 
essentially of practical nature: How can thousands of bonds be assured to have CACs 
                                                          
25 This opinion is deduced by the author of this article, following an analogy process through which he 
extends the general rationale of the statutarists-internalists to the concrete case of the quoted new reform. 
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with identical wordings? How can the clauses of bonds of different laws and jurisdictions 
be made sure to receive the same interpretation? (A. O. Krueger 2002, 32). These 
questions, these agents observe, are not just rhetorical. Over recent decades, vulture 
funds (among other actors) have created essentially innovative strategies to exploit and 
open fissures in the existing SDR frameworks; only one interpretation in favor of their 
interests is enough to question the feasibility of large collective processes. Then, the 
agents in this position intend to complement CACs with statutory uniform rules for SDRs 
(A. Krueger 2013). 
 
IV–4 Statutory-externalists position 
 
The agents of this position propose a statutory mechanism external to the IMF 
current framework for SDRs. Like statutarists-internalists, these agents: a) evaluate the 
models of contractual clauses by comparing them with other models or contractual 
clauses but, mainly, keeping in mind a projected statutory mechanism and/or 
extrapolating the roles of corporate bankruptcy laws to sovereign level (Buchheit, 
Gelpern, and Gulati 2013); b) claim that the contractual approach does not fully solve 
the SDR problems, especially in complex and heterogeneous processes (J. E. Stiglitz et al. 
2014); c) consider that the current IMF framework makes restructuring unnecessarily 
expensive without generating practices tending to greater market efficiency (J. Stiglitz 
2009, chap. 5, point 68). 
Notwithstanding, these statutarists, unlike internalists, understand that the 
global economic system is –in the present historical stage of development– inherently 
contradictory and that the IMF has contributed to producing and deepening its 
contradictions (J. Stiglitz 2009).  This position occupies, in terms of Bourdieu, a 
heterodox position in the field of the SDR debate: it questions the assumptions which 
the debate itself is built on and the questions that define it (Bourdieu 2002, 1:120). The 
main premise of this position considers that the current IMF proposal, although superior 
to the existing institutional arrangements, makes changes designed to underpin the 
status quo or «to change little or not much» (Alvarez and Adelarde 2015): these agents 
propose an SDR statutory mechanism as an integral part of a set of reforms to modify 
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The rationale behind the present international economic system –it is stated– 
does not tend, as the IMF pre-assumes, towards equilibrium. In this view, the global 
financial crisis, the UN Stiglitz Report states, “is the latest and most impactful of several 
concurrent crises –of food, of water, of energy, and of sustainability– that are tightly 
interrelated (…): these multiple crises are not the result of a failure or failures of the 
system. Rather, the system itself –its organization and principles, and its distorted and 
flawed institutional mechanisms– is the cause of many of these failures” (J. Stiglitz 2009, 
8). From the standpoint of these agents, what interrelates these crises is an economic 
doctrine, known as «neoliberalism» or «market fundamentalism», whose theoretical 
and methodological starting pre-assumptions are, at best, questionable (J. Stiglitz 2009, 
chap. 1, point 9). Seen this way, these agents observe that an SDR market solution, as 
that proposed by the IMF, should begin by inquiring whether the required assumptions 
(following the very doctrine it is built on) for the market to work properly are, in fact, 
true where the solution intends to be implemented: for this reason, they conclude, a 
debate over the ideas that deconstruct the barriers artificially drawn by economic 
orthodoxy (which appears as The economy) between an idealized –formal and abstract– 
market and society is needed (Xercavins 2009, 13).  
From this perspective, the global financial system has systematically failed over 
the recent decades (J. Stiglitz 2009, conclusion, point 19). The gap between a 
hypothetically atomized and well informed sovereign debt market and a true highly 
concentrated and heterogeneous market has led to widening the gap between the 
officially stated and the effectively achieved objectives (J. Stiglitz 2009, chap. 3, point 7). 
Over the last decades, the financial system expanded its domain over to other social 
areas, and its failures profoundly impacted on the proper functioning of society at large 
(J. Stiglitz 2009, chap. 3). In this scenario, the IMF organizes SDRs by means of a 
framework which –in this view– «absurdly» reduces social reality to an analytical 
universe that begins and ends in an idealized financial system or, in other words, to a 
reality in which all variables exogenous to the system appear invisible (J. Stiglitz 2009, 9). 
Similarly, this framework introduces the correct integration of a State to the financial 
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means to pursue other superior purposes (for instance, full enjoyment of human 
rights).27 
The IMF plays a key role in the neoliberal financial governance (Harvey 2007). In 
the 1970s, this organization, following a trial and error process, internalized the new 
economic orthodoxy and since then has played a prominent role in its dissemination, 
particularly in moments of crises in emerging markets (Wallerstein 2009). In this sense, 
this stance considers that the IMF official discourse of a relatively successful 
restructuring strategy in the 1980s, which lost effectiveness later in the 1990s, is, at 
best, a biased consideration of the events. Taking the perspective of the territories 
where the strategy was actually implemented, the results were not very encouraging; in 
fact, in Latin America, where the IMF intervention acquired maximum intensity, the 
1980s are known as “the lost decade” (Ugarchete 2007a). The challenges to 
neoliberalism over the 1990s did not reach the SDR field. Although, –these agents 
observe– the IMF has undergone changes in virtually all the areas since the Washington 
Consensus, the institution continues to promote market deregulation and (neo–
)liberalization (Patomaki 2009); on the other hand, it understands the causes of crises by 
putting aside neoliberalism itself and the market failures (Ugarchete 2012, 45–76, Diana 
Aguiar; Lee 2012, 122). Following these assumptions, the IMF recent reforms on 
restructurings –these structuralists state– improve but do not increase the existing 
regulations (Steimberg 2011, 107).   
The 2014 Report did not emerge from a fully agreed political process, as the IMF 
promotes it (Gelpner 2014; Hagan 2014). The current IFA, born in the post-war period, is 
a financial architecture with a structurally biased power distribution (Ugarchete 2007b). 
The IMF governance, in particular, provides an institutionally disproportionate 
representation of the USA and of the G7 countries, something which, in this perspective, 
is denounced and demands modification (Larralde Hernandez 2014). In this scenario, the 
2014 Report arose from a network of relations coordinated by the USA Treasury, the 
ICMA and the IMF itself (IMF 2014b). Therefore, it is a network of relations which 
updates, specifically, what Sousa Santos calls “the political matrix of the neoliberal 
globalization”, a matrix which, since the 1970s, the author says, has been interwoven 
with different arrangements, more or less formal, among the advanced economies 
                                                          
27 See, for instance, A/HRC/20/23, “Report of the Independent Expert on the Effects of Foreign Debt (…)”, 10 
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official sector, associations of financial corporations and the IFIs mostly controlled by 
them (Sousa Santos and Rodriguez Garavito 2007, 33). This political matrix, in the 
particular case, following this view, was only partial or limitedly inclusive; in the matrix, 
heterodox agents with a potentially different worldview about financial globalization did 
not participate. More specifically, in the matrix were not represented or, at least, not 
with significant weight: 1) peripheral and semi-peripheral countries or groups of 
countries; 2) other associations of financial corporations with headquarters outside the 
G7 countries territory; 3) associations of non-financial economic agents, workers and 
civil society (Montes and Wierzba 2015; Stichelmans 2015).  
Similarly, statutarists-externalits warn against the contractualists´ statement 
concerning the lack of consensus to open a debate to draw an SDR statutory 
mechanism. In this view, this statement can only be considered from within the 
neoliberal governance (Sousa Santos and Rodriguez Garavito 2007; Lee 2012). In this 
sense, these agents show that the 2014-2015 resolutions that effectively opened this 
discussion at the UN were approved at the General Assembly by 124, 128 and 136 
countries, and obtained the negative vote of only 11, 6 and 5 countries, respectively, 
precisely those of the G7 included.28 Although they had been invited, neither the latter 
nor the IFIs were part of the Ad Hoc Committee established according to such UN 
resolutions. Therefore, the agents in this perspective invite a reflection on whether 
behind the official reasons given by these actors to justify their absence there may be 
other reasons related to avoiding circumstances perceived as challenging to their global 
governance dominant position (Mattli and Woods 2009, Heillener Eric). 
Like internalists, these statutarists make a rather large effort to show the limits 
which –they understand– the contractual approach has to properly organize 
restructuring processes and, then, justify the need of creating a statutory mechanism 
(Brooks et al. 2015; Guzman and Stiglitz 2015). In this direction, these agents believe 
that the residual and fragmented IMF framework for SDRs causes a degree of 
inconsistency and vagueness which could be avoided with a statutory mechanism 
specifically designed for restructurings, written complete first attempt. Similarly, they 
highlight the problems which can probably arise in future SDR processes given the 
existence of bonds with different models of contractual clauses or with similar models 
                                                          
28 See, UN Resolutions: A/RES/68/304 (September 9, 2014), A/C.2/69/L.4/Rev.1 (November 22, 2014) and 
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but with different wording. Even if the new IMF proposed models had good market 
reception, its contractual nature –statutarists point out– would not affect the existing 
stock of outstanding bonds nor assure that the new models have identical wording or 
similar interpretations on the part of judges of different jurisdictions. The absence of 
certainty would not allow –or would not do so to the extent these agents understand a 
statutory mechanism should– removal of the stigma associated with restructurings to 
make them faster, timelier, and in more orderly processes (Brooks et al. 2015; Guzman 
and Stiglitz 2015).  With this purpose, the proposals discussed at the UN simplified the 
SDR activation forms, standardized their stages, set the terms and the finalizing modes.29   
Also, the agents with this perspective agree with the statutarists–internalists 
that the contractual approach does not achieve results similar to those of a statutory 
mechanism; Stiglitz thinks that at corporate level the contractual approach would have 
been adopted if it were the case, but no State worldwide thought it appropriate (J. E. 
Stiglitz et al. 2014, point 14). These agents mainly emphasize two structural dimensions 
at the time of justifying this assertion. Firstly, they note that the current sovereign debt 
market is composed of creditors and of States of particularly heterogeneous nature. The 
players’ homogeneity is the exception rather than the rule (Brooks et al. 2015).  
Secondly, statutarists warn that restructuring processes push agents to compete; agents 
who seek to maximize their profits and minimize their losses in a scenario of economic 
distress which, from the start prevent debtors honoring their debts as originally 
planned. This scarcity situation makes these processes essentially conflictive. 
Consequently, domestic legal systems remove this kind of processes from Civil or 
Commercial Law and placed them in legal branches with limitations on full individual 
autonomy to prevent «the survival of the fittest» (Ranieri 2015).  Why then –these 
statutarists ask– should we think that in the sovereign field, where inequality and the 
complexity of the interests at stake are often higher than in the corporate field, a 
voluntary and decentralized regulative modality would work efficiently? (J. E. Stiglitz et 
al. 2014, point 14).  
The proposals discussed at the UN, in line with the SDRM and unlike the IMF 
contractual approach, considered necessary to assure the participation of the 
international community in restructurings30 The Fund intervention, as established in its 
                                                          
29 For instance, see UN proposal by Argentina (2015). 
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current framework, is deemed inadequate. This is so because the IMF: a) is strongly 
influenced by the advanced economies, particularly with USA prevalence; it is also a 
creditor and, therefore, involved in a game intended to arbitrate. The principles adopted 
at the UN require «impartiality» and «independence» (A/RES/69/319 2015, principle 4); 
b) does not enjoy capabilities and roles designed specifically to manage or coordinate 
these processes. These statutarists propose entities (bankruptcy courts, commissions or 
forums), equipped with specific instruments to allow them to intervene in SDRs 
processes timely and in appropriate manner, considering the particular characteristics of 
their stages (UN proposal by Argentina 2015; Ugarchete and Acosta 2003); c) has proved 
to be permeable to the pressures of agents with particular interests in these processes. 
This view reveals that, in highly conflictive events, the IMF tends to orient its decisions 
not necessarily based on technical criteria, and warns that a statutory mechanism can 
help to reduce this kind of deviations (PIIE 2014, 33, Schadler Susan).  
In particular, this perspective questions the conditionalities of the IMF programs 
which usually accompany restructurings: a) the negotiation of these conditionalities and 
the political costs associated with their austerity policies often contribute to the delay of 
the SDR process implementation;31 b) the implementation of the conditionalities can 
undermine basic pillars of the Debtor State democratic system. In practice, the 
possibilities that a government of a peripheral or semi-peripheral country, heavily 
indebted and in crisis, operate from outside the IMF are in fact severely restricted 
considering that the international financial governance was created around the IMF. 
According to this perspective, in many cases, the Fund has used its strength position to 
«impose» –rather than «recommend»– conditionalities on debtors, something which 
trespasses the democratic principles of people sovereignty, government accountability 
and transparency, and also the autonomy and sovereignty of a State;32  c) the IMF 
conditionalities content, following the neoliberal economic doctrine, tends to be 
counter-productive. The IMF adjustment policies –it is understood– are pro-cyclical and 
exacerbate the economic downturn of the Debtor State, and those Fund policies 
directed to liberalize and deregulate its economy expose the State to greater volatility 
and risk (J. Stiglitz 2009, chap. 1, point 36). Meanwhile, the UN Human Rights Council 
                                                          
31 See the different opinions about the IMF conditionalities enumerated in (Meltzer 2000).  
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(HRC) warns against the negative effects that the IMF austerity policies can have on the 
full enforcement of human rights of the population where the policies are applied.33 
The IMF framework for SDRs does not expressly recognize the sovereign status 
of States.34  Its 2014 Report, like any other contractual regulation, generally equates the 
State to private agents. Once a contract has been signed, the relations between the 
involved parties are governed by its regulations. In case of default, the State can be 
demanded as if it were a private agent: this is, according to the Civil or Commercial Law 
of the agreed jurisdiction (Ranieri 2015). The State –following this perspective– is an 
entity ontologically different from a private agent and is not reduced to its government 
(J. E. Stiglitz et al. 2014, point 2). Among the different roles of a State are those related 
to the obligation of assuring a set of predefined rights to their population, some of them 
considered essential to the human condition by the international legal order (Human 
Rights).35 Therefore, statutarists understand that this confusion in the analysis of the 
IMF –which treats as similar agents who are essentially not similar and, at the same 
time, reduces the SDR field to an economic issue that begins and ends in the analytical 
universe of an idealized financial market– implies negative practical consequences not 
only for the correct organization of these processes but also for other more 
transcendent purposes.36 
The 2014 Report does not equitably distribute the rights and obligations 
between the parties involved in restructurings (J. Stiglitz 2009, chap. 5). Indeed, this 
report defines principles in which the Debtor State appears as the active agent of their 
materialization and the creditors as their recipients or beneficiary agents. Specifically, 
the Debtor State must act collaboratively in these processes (IMF 2013a, 10), with 
transparency (IMF 2014b, 31) and in good faith (IMF 2014b, 26) towards creditors. 
However, the report does no set prescriptions in the opposite direction:  that is to say, 
specific obligations of creditors towards the Debtor State. It is considered that this is not 
a minor issue if it is noted that not all creditors tend to act collaboratively, in good faith 
and with transparency in SDR processes; in fact, these statutarists claim, certain groups 
                                                          
33 A/HRC/27/L.26–UN, “Effects of vulture funds (…) on the full enforcement of all Human Rights”,  23 
September 2014.   
34 On the 2014 Report, this status is only indirectly recognized by quoting the sovereign immunity principle 
in relation to the USA FSIA. See, (IMF 2014b, 35).   
35 A/HRC/20/23, “Report of the Independent Expert on the effects of foreign debt (…)”, 10 April 2011, UN. 
36 A/HRC/27/L.26–UN, “Effects of vulture funds (…) on the full enforcement of all Human Rights”, 23 
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of creditors have institutional incentives to act precisely in the opposite sense.37 
Following these lines, the proposals discussed at the UN suggested a series of measures 
to prevent these groups from unduly influencing restructurings (UN proposal by 
Argentina 2015). The IMF report organizes creditors but does not prescribe –unlike such 
proposals (ex., UN proposal by Argentina 2015)–  any joint action among States: in 
effect, the relations of the restructuring State with other States appear, in the IMF 
framework for SDRs, always mediated by the IMF itself, whose governance and 
orientation, it is to be noted, is not neutral (Kulfas and Schorr 2003; Stichelmans 2015, 
9). 
While statutarists-internalists lay stress –aware of the rest of the conflictive 
issues– on the need of speeding the start of restructurings, these statutarists lay the 
stress on the too little issue: States in distress  –Guzmán and Stiglitz state– like 
failing corporations need a fresh start (Guzman and Stiglitz 2015, 1). There is –in this 
view– an institutional bias in the IMF organization and practices which contributes to 
make SDR processes too little: the costs arising from the IMF SDR framework often make 
the Debtor States delay, in practice, the activation of restructurings (too late issue), or 
accelerate them, but on condition of presenting superficial restructuring offers that 
suppose only a temporary relief (too little issue). When a State wields strong bargaining 
power, the Fund framework leaves margin to prolong the costs of restructuring over 
time. One way or the other, debtors tend to maintain serious macro-economic 
imbalance associated with their high level of sovereign debt, and very often have to re-
restructure their debts (Guzman and Stiglitz 2015). The reforms recently approved by 
the IMF improve but do not solve these problems (Guzman and Stiglitz 2015). For 
example, the updated Fund debt sustainability analysis is not oriented –as it should be– 
exclusively to guiding these processes, which makes the decision of restructuring a 
sovereign debt appear mediated by an analysis that seeks to simultaneously guide a set 
of relatively autonomous IMF roles (Schadler 2016; UNCTAD 2015). The result is a tight 
institutional framework that ultimately affects the too litle issue (Schadler 2016, 4; 
UNCTAD 2015, 16). Something similar happens with the last modification of the IMF 
exceptional access framework (IMF 2015b). The modification seeks to influence the too 
                                                          
37 For example, creditors who have legal claims against the Debtor State and those who own, either directly 
or via an agent, Credit Default Swaps (CDs) are –from this perspective– part of said groups. See, for instance, 
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late issue by changing the Fund lending policy. However, in the so-called «grey zone 
cases» the reform proposes a «debt reprofiling» and rejects a more «definitive type of 
debt restructuring» (that is to say, a debt haircut or similar), (IMF 2015b, 1). Thus, the 
modification fixes a priori a limit to the depth of the restructuring that is not evaluated 
in direct relation to the future debt sustainability, and appears essentially mediated by 
the IMF roles of lender and bailout coordinator.38 Consequently, the creation of a 
statutory mechanism specifically designed for SDRs is judged, from this perspective, as 
fundamental. This mechanism –according to some proposals– should allow the review of 
the legality of the debt to be restructured and, in some cases, its legitimacy (theory of 
the “odious debt”), (Olmos 2006). 
The IMF framework does not change the role that currently local jurisdictions 
play in sovereign debt markets. Like internalists, these statutarists consider that 
collective restructuring processes tend to meet tension with individual legal proceedings 
(Guzman and Stiglitz 2015). Nevertheless, these statutarists show, at least, two more 
dimensions of this issue. Firstly, they observe that the IMF Report –by focusing on the 
New York and England Law bonds– strengthens the role of these jurisdictions in an AFI 
that structurally distributes power unequally. By means of interventions in 
restructurings, these States can internationalize their own Law system and judicial 
authority (Ruggie 1982).  Considering the prevailing role the jurisdiction of New York 
plays in the IFA, Piketti defines this role in terms of a “USA juridical hegemonism” that 
the new IMF proposal, it is reiterated, seeks to reinforce.39  Secondly, the Fund 
framework –unlike statutory proposals– fully preserves the structural limits of the 
jurisdictions which operate in SDR processes. These limits arise from their own local 
nature: a) the power of jurisdiction of the judges is, by general principle, circumscribed 
to the territory of the State they belong to and should be used in debt restructuring 
cases to solve problems which involve actors and capital flows essentially reproduced at 
global level. The difference of scales (“local jurisdiction vs. global problem”), it is argued, 
has not only negative consequences for the correct management of the trials 
themselves, but also for the financial system at large (Halverson Cross 2015); b) 
sovereign debt contracts do not change over time. Between the moment a credit is 
                                                          
38 This opinion is deduced by the author of this article, following an analogy process through which he 
extends the general rationale of the statutarists-externalits to the concrete case of the quoted new reform.  
39 Thomas Piketty, “Lo que sufre Argentina por el hegemonismo jurídico norteamericano (…)”, 30 November 
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issued and the moment a creditor brings legal actions, years may pass. During those 
years, the laws or/and the jurisprudence criteria may significantly change at the local 
host jurisdiction. Thus, agents (Debtor States and creditors) who operate at global scale 
are subject to changes intrinsically tied to the particular dynamism of that local 
jurisdiction (Barry 2015). In practice, actors, with vested interests, strategically set 
domestic networks to orient the changes to their own benefit (Kupelian and Rivas 2014). 
Based on these assumptions, statutarists consider the IMF reforms associated with the 
new contractual models as positive but superficial, and propose different measures to 
limit the influence of local jurisdictions on restructurings (UN proposal by Argentina 
2015). 
The 2014 Report does not expressly recognize «vulture funds» which are 
included, without naming them, in the generic categories of “holdouts” or “litigating 
creditors” (IMF 2014b).  The agents holding this view argue that the vultures fund issue 
cannot be reduced, as the IMF does, to the economic dimension and to a collective 
action problem; the mere existence of these funds –which within the system itself is 
presented as rational– is the proof and the result of multiple system irrationalities.40 
Therefore, statutarists propose to address this issue from a different worldview and as 
part of a set of comprehensive reforms.41 Specifically related to restructurings, these 
agents assess the IMF contractual solution insufficient to face their particular nature: 
vulture funds are not ordinary litigating creditors or holdouts; they are actors with a 
series of specialized resources which have allowed them not only to use the ambiguities 
of the system but also to stretch its limits to their benefit. Why –these statutarists ask– 
should we think, for example, that the new model of pari passu clauses will mean a 
sufficient barrier to contain these funds, when it was them who, in a particular historical 
context, redefined the long-term established traditional meaning and use of the pari 
passu clauses? A voluntary solution, as the one proposed, makes a degree of uncertainty 
fertile for these funds while it maintains the majority of the institutional factors which 
enable their existence and practices (J. Stiglitz 2014). 
                                                          
40 See, A/HRC/27/L.26 “Effects (…) of all human rights: the activities of vulture funds”, 23 September, 2014; 
A/HRC/14/21, 2010, Report of the Independent Expert about Vulture Funds”, 29 April 2010, Cephas Lumina, 
HCR UN; Jubilee USA Network, (2008), “Vulture Funds and Poor Country Debt: Recent Developments and 
Policy Responses”, Briefing Note, 4 April, 2008; UN HRC, (2015), “Vulture funds and human rights”, Remarks 
by Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky Independent Expert, 14th session of the Council Advisory Committee, 25 
February, UN.  
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The principles adopted at the UN expressly encourage the incorporation of CACs 
in future sovereign debt issues (A/RES/69/319 2015, principle 9). However, statutarists 
observe that the new “single–limb” CACs do not solve all the restructuring problems and 
leave margin for a number of questions related to aggregation: “How can –Brooks asks– 
bonds issued in different denominations be assessed? With different maturities? With 
different seniorities? How expansive is the list of creditors? Several key inter-creditor 
issues –such as voting rights across different classes of creditors, or the potential for a 
majority to deprive minority creditors of their rights– are left unaddressed” (Brooks et 
al. 2015, 8). 
 
 
V– Final considerations 
 
This article, contrary to what most of the literature maintains, considers that the 
categories contractualist vs. statutarists are not enough to fully understand the SDR 
debate. In these categories, there are perspectives with significant differences: without 
a deep comprehension of these differences, there is no explanation why observers of 
the same social phenomenon –the IMF proposal– have not only diverse but just 
opposite opinions about it. In this sense, it is argued that the SDR debate is not neutral: 
this is so not only because of the different interests and worldviews at stake, but also 
because of the practical implications concerning the sovereign debt market. However, 
the debate is not either reducible to a purely ideological debate: the way in which the 
participants in the academic field dispute the organization of restructuring processes 
follows its own rules which cannot be fully compared to those in the economic and 
political fields. 
The analysis of this area of the academic field shows that despite the 
widespread use of the “contractual vs. statutory approach” dichotomy, in the literature 
there is not a unique criterion at the time of defining said conceptual pair. In this 
context, the performed review of the literature is judged relevant since it gives the 
reader a synthesis of the most often used «defining criteria». More importantly, the 
article has inquired into the «classificatory criteria» by means of which the participants 
in the SDR debate are grouped and differentiated. The degree of generalization of the 
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SDRs) in relation to other similar academic works will largely depend of the role that the 
authors of these works give to the Fund in their analysis.  
The study of the classificatory criteria helps with some relevant considerations 
about the dynamics of the SDR academic field: a) the possibility of visualizing elements 
of the republican vs. democrat ideal types in a debate at global scale shows the weight 
that the USA academic field has in this area; b) the idealized categories universalists vs. 
territorialists of the cross boarder corporate bankruptcies debate make no sense in the 
SDR debate in the absence of bankruptcy laws for Sovereign States. The outlined 
criticisms in this paper about the role of local jurisdictions in sovereign restructurings 
can help to enrich the theoretical discussions in relation to the benefits of replicating in 
this area the universalist position (Makoff 2015); c) only by choosing a reference to 
compare the contents of a given regulative modality can an observer assert that such 
modality is pro-debtors or pro-creditors. However, in practice, the analyzed externalist 
positions –and largely because of their initial assumptions– placed a priori the 
contractual and statutory approaches in one of these two extremes; d) the advanced vs. 
emerging countries ideal types make sense when the SDR debate is thought in terms of 
a dispute over the global financial governance; e) the defining elements of the orthodox 
vs. heterodox idealized categories are visible particularly in the presented externalist 
positions. From the perspective of one of these positions, the other three remaining 
positions here addressed are considered heterodox or orthodox, respectively. 
The definition of the IMF framework for SDRs is a complex task in itself. This is so 
because its content is defined by means of the interrelation of multiple parts which vary 
over time in a relatively independent manner. The performed analysis contributes to 
show two historical regularities of this framework: a) not all its component parts have 
the same value: the IMF organizes SDR processes by means of its «lending policy». This 
obeys the peculiarities of its historical origin; indeed, the SDR framework emerged as a 
result of the redefinition of the Fund's position concerning bailouts after the crises of 
emerging countries in the late 1990s and early 2000s; b) the global crisis did not mean a 
paradigm shift in relation to the IMF role and worldview about restructurings. The 
changes made on the basis of the 2013 Report seek to make more efficient –but not to 
replace– the parts that give content to the IMF framework emerged in the early 2000s; 
nor do they seek, considering a broader timescale, to replace the IMF pillars built after 




Rev. Direito e Práx., Rio de Janeiro, Vol. XX, N. X, 2018, p. XX-XX. 
Alejandro Gabriel Manzo 
DOI: 10.1590/2179-8966/2018/30095| ISSN: 2179-8966 
 
51 
More specifically, the performed analysis helps to show that the said framework 
sets in motion the following interrelated parts to organize restructurings: a) the IMF 
exceptional access policy has significance at the start of these processes and defines the 
participation of the international community in them, represented by the Fund itself. In 
general terms, it may be said that when a sovereign debt is deemed unsustainable, the 
IMF recommends its rapid restructuring and provides support to the process with a 
lending program. The last reform to the policy seeks to reduce the delays related to the 
activation of recent SDR processes (or, in other words, to promote “preemptive” 
restructurings); b) the DSA aims to provide objective and technically precise elements to 
support the IMF decisions avoiding its possible politicization: in effect, the DSA ties the 
when, how and how much restructuring of a sovereign debt to a complex calculation of 
its sustainability. The data that allow this calculation come mainly from the exercise of 
the IMF surveillance role over the economies of its member-states. Then, the DSA enjoys 
the power of influencing a given restructuring process without needing to resort to the 
IMF and its lending policy; c) the Fund conditionalities are related to the control of those 
aspects of the Debtor State economic policy that the IMF deems critical in SDR cases and 
in their immediately following stage. The conditionalities also help to calculate the 
efforts of the different participants in restructurings. The reforms of 2002 and 2009 
were mainly directed to avoid a possible Fund interference in areas of States not 
considered by it as strictly necessary; d) the LIA policy becomes relevant in those cases 
in which the restructuring State has already incurred in arrears with its creditors. The 
Fund aims to provide financial support even to post-default processes, although 
following certain conditions. These conditions seek to encourage good practices of the 
member-states in SDRs. The LIA policy also intends to promote, indirectly, the 
participation of official agents in the financing of those States in economic distress. The 
last modification is directed to shorten the breach between these agents and the private 
ones. 
In fact, the IMF framework does not regulate SDR processes. It influences or 
aims to influence all aspects of SDR organization by means of regulating the Fund 
practices, taking into consideration its central role in the global financial governance. 
Who regulates restructurings in this context is, actually, «the market»: indeed, the IMF 
leaves to the Debtor State and its creditors the power to decentralize and voluntarily set 
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issuance. The 2014 Report precisely seeks to condition the wording of these contracts by 
making available to them new models of pari passu clauses and CACs. These models are 
constructed in order to solve collective action problems detected by the IMF in the 
latest restructurings. 
The performed analysis also helps to assert that all the involved participants in 
the SDR debate agree to considering that the 2014 Report potentially achieve its 
purpose: the proposed models of clauses in it are in theory more efficient than the 
existing models at the time of managing collective action problems, although –it is worth 
mentioning– contractualists-externalists believe the problems are not such, or not really 
significant. However, the participants also agree that the IMF initiative leaves some 
degree of uncertainty concerning future SDR processes: the «depth», «significance» and 
«implications» of such uncertainty in the sovereign debt market vary considering the 
pre-assumptions and interests of each of the addressed positions. 
For the contractualists-internalists, this uncertainty is mostly associated with a 
«transition period» in which the market players could be reluctant to adopt the new 
proposed models or in which, even adopting them, the new models will coexist with the 
existing ones. From this perspective, this uncertainty is regarded as a foreseen risk of 
the chosen contractual approach itself, which should be assessed according to the 
potential achievements and considering that a statutory alternative is politically not 
feasible yet undesirable because of the unpredictable consequences for the proper 
functioning of the financial market. The manner in which this uncertainty may affect 
future SDR processes –it is considered– will largely depend on how judges interpret the 
pari passu clauses in subsequent years and on the speed at which the proposed models 
be spread; exchange of the stock of already issued bonds is advisable. 
The significance of the uncertainty is closely related, for contractualists-
externalists, to the manner in which the new IMF proposal weakens «market discipline» 
and «creditors´ rights» in SDRs. In this regard, the uncertainty should be assessed as part 
of a historical period in which creditors have (serious) difficulties at the moment of 
enforcing their rights and in which, simultaneously, Debtor States enjoy better chances 
when they have the opportunity to modify creditors’ rights. The impact of the 
implementation of the IMF initiative on the proper functioning of the market will largely 
depend on whether the sovereign risk alteration is similarly reflected in an alteration of 
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proportion, following the free market logic, in the near future there will be sovereign 
under- or over-borrowing, which may result in new financial crises.  
Both statutorist positions, although with different worldviews and interests, 
consider that the new IMF proposal leaves a greater degree of uncertainty than the 
degree assessed by its supporters to the extent that, on the one hand, in practice, the 
proposal will hardly reach the theoretically expected benefits; on the other, the 
framework the proposal is based on does not offer solutions to certain key SDR 
problems. These positions associate the level of uncertainty not only to a transitional 
period but also to the nature of the IMF contractual approach itself; the approach loses 
efficiency in complex processes, and establishes relations among structurally 
heterogeneous agents which are intrinsically conflictive; uncertainty is also related to 
the residual, fragmented and incomplete character of the IMF framework for 
restructurings. Statutarists consider that uncertainty makes future SDR processes 
unnecessarily unpredictable, affecting, then, the proper functioning of the sovereign 
debt market. 
In this way, the article offers a road map to the SDR debate, which was drawn 
trying to avoid –certainly without having fully achieved it– the preferences of a 
researcher who analyzes the academic field where he interacts.42 The criteria used to 
create the positions shown in Table 1 could themselves be a matter of discussion; also, 
each of the addressed positions has its own internal divisions that this paper, for 
practical reasons, made invisible. Making explicit the pre-assumptions and interests –
usually implicit– where the SDR debate participants speak from is considered a good 






                                                          
42 When researchers, Bourdieu says, study their own universe, they must be aware of three types of bias 
that will accompany the research. Such biases arise from: a) the social and scientific route involving the 
researcher; b) the assumptions implicit in the concepts used; c) the temptation to use their construction to 
promote their own interests in the academic field. The struggle against these biases supposes an 
inexhaustible process of self-reflection and, therefore, a process which will never reach the point where it is 
possible to contemplate all the field partial perspectives without getting trapped in one of such 
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